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FUTURE WAR AND THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Eric Talbot Jensen∗
ABSTRACT
Since its passage in 1973 over the veto of then-President Nixon, the War
Powers Resolution (WPR) has been laden with controversy. Labeled as
everything from ineffective to unconstitutional, the WPR has generally failed in
its design to require notification and consultation to Congress by the
President. Despite numerous proposals to amend the WPR, it continues to
languish in the twilight of Executive war powers, and its future is bleak.
With emerging technologies such as drones, cyber tools, nanotechnology,
and genomics, the ineffectiveness of the WPR will prove even more profound.
The WPR’s reliance on “armed forces” and “hostilities” as triggers for the
reporting and consulting requirements of the statute will prove completely
inadequate to regulate the use of these advanced technologies. Rather, as the
President analyzes the applicability of the WPR to military operations using
these advancing technologies, he will determine that the WPR is not triggered
and he has no reporting requirements. Recent conflicts (or potential conflicts)
in Libya, Syria and Iraq highlight this inevitability.
For the WPR to achieve the aim it was originally intended to accomplish,
Congress will need to amend the statute to cover emerging technologies that
do not require “boots on the ground” to be effective and which would not
constitute “hostilities.” This article proposes expanding the coverage of the
WPR from actions by armed forces to actions by armed forces personnel,
supplies or capabilities. The article also proposes expanding the coverage of
the statute to hostilities and violations of the sovereignty of other nations by
the armed forces.

∗ Associate Professor, Brigham Young University Law School. The author would like to thank Ashley
Gengler, Grant Hodgson, Court Roper and Aaron Worthen who provided excellent research and review
assistance for this article.
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INTRODUCTION
As United States President Barack Obama contemplated taking military
action against Syria in the wake of alleged chemical attacks, he stated that he
had authority to do so without Congressional approval.1 However, after
deciding to consult Congress, he was told that the wording of any resolution
that would receive Congressional approval would have to be narrowly tailored,
limiting the use of armed forces both in time and type.2 In fact, Senator John
McCain threatened that if President Obama were to put “boots on the ground”
in Syria, he would face impeachment.3 These preconditions for Congressional
approval invoke the traditional tension between Congress’s constitutional
power to “declare war”4 on one hand and the Executive’s foreign affairs power
and the President’s role as Commander in Chief on the other.5
The debate is not new. Books,6 judicial opinions,7 commission reports,8 law
reviews,9 and newspapers10 regularly discuss this tension between Congress

1 Matthew Larotonda & Jon Garcia, President Obama Seeks Congressional Approval for Syria Action,
ABC NEWS, (Aug. 31, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-obama-seeks-congressional-approvalsyria-action/story?id=20127274 (quoting President Obama, who said, “I believe I have the authority to carry
out this military action without specific congressional authorization . . .”).
2 Karen Tumulty, Reps. Chris Van Hollen, Gerry Connolly draft narrow authorization of force in Syria,
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/van-hollen-connolly-draft-narrowauthorization-of-force-in-syria/2013/09/03/7cbc6b60-14c0-11e3-b182-1b3bb2eb474c_story.html.
3 Sean Sullivan, McCain: Obama would face impeachment if he puts “boots on the ground” in Syria,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/09/06/mccainobama-would-face-impeachment-if-he-puts-boots-on-the-ground-in-syria/.
4 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
5 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 1.
6 See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY 1 (2013).
7 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952); Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
8 See JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., UNIV. OF VA., MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, NAT’L WAR POWERS
COMM’N REPORT 11–19 (2008), available at http://millercenter.org/policy/commissions/warpowers/report.
9 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical
Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012); Michael A. Newton, Inadvertent
Implications of the War Powers Resolution, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 173, 179–80 (2012); Saikrishna
Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by “Declare War”, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
45 (2007); Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander In Chief, 80
VA. L. REV. 833, 835 (1994); Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an Unconstitutional,
Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud That Contributed Directly to the 9/11 Attacks, 45 CASE. W. RES. J. INT’L L.
109 (2012); Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution: Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unhelpful, 17
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 683 (1984), available at http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol17/iss3/5.
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and the President on the use of military force. The debate has been
characterized by what seems to be an ever-increasing adventurism by the
President and an ever-decreasing willingness to exert power by the Congress.11
Perhaps the last show of real strength in the debate from Congress came in the
immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War.12 With the President in crisis,13
Congress passed a joint resolution that became known as the War Powers
Resolution (WPR).14 It was intended to re-exert Congress’s power over war
making and force the President to provide notification and seek approval for
the use of the military.15 After passage, President Nixon immediately vetoed
the Resolution, claiming it was clearly an unconstitutional infringement on his
role as the Executive.16
Congress responded by overriding President Nixon’s veto on November 7,
1973.17 Almost immediately, the War Powers Resolution became a source of
great controversy. In addition to President Nixon and his successors,18
scholars19 have claimed the WPR is an unconstitutional infringement on
Commander-in-Chief powers. These constitutional issues can be broadly
characterized in two major categories: the allocation of war powers between
the President and Congress; and, the requirement for the President to withdraw
10 See, e.g., Stephen G. Rademaker, Congress and the myth of the 60-Day Clock, WASH. POST (May 24,
2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-24/opinions/35233150_1_libya-operation-war-powersresolution-president-obama; Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in
Libya Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A16.
11 Geoffrey S. Corn, Triggering Congressional War Powers Notification: A Proposal to Reconcile
Constitutional Practice with Operational Reality, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 687, 690 (2010). “Presidents
will invariably interpret the failure of Congress to affirmatively oppose such initiatives as a license to continue
operations.” Id.; John Yoo, Like It or Not, Constitution Allows Obama to Strike Syria Without Congressional
Approval, FOX NEWS, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/08/30/constitution-allowsobama-to-strike-syria-without-congressional-approval/ (summarizing the historical tension between Congress’
power to declare war and the President’s role as Commander in Chief).
12 Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time To Say Goodbye, 113 POL. SCI.
Q. 1 (1998). “The War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973 is generally considered the high-water mark for
congressional reassertion in national security affairs.” Id.
13 Newton, supra note 9, at 179–80 (explaining that President Nixon was in the throes of the Watergate
scandal at this time).
14 War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148 §8, 87 Stat. 559 (codified as 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–
1548 (2006)).
15 Id. at § 1541.
16 Veto of War Powers Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1285 (Oct. 24, 1973).
17 119 Cong. Rec. 36, 198, 221–22 (1973)) (Senate); id. at 36, 221–22 (House).
18 For example, see President Nixon’s explanation of his veto of the proposed law. Veto of War Powers
Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1285 (Oct. 24, 1973). 5 Pub. Papers 893 (Oct. 24, 1973).
19 See, e.g., BAKER ET AL., supra note 8, at 23; Abraham D. Sofaer, The War Powers Resolution: Fifteen
Years Later, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 317, 326 (1989); Turner, supra note 9.
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forces either after sixty days of inaction by Congress approving the
deployment or after a concurrent resolution by Congress.20
One of the topics that has received insufficient attention in the continuing
discourse, and the topic of this article, is the potential impact and applicability
of the WPR to future armed conflicts.21 The world stands on the threshold of
incredible advances in weapons technology that are of such a qualitative nature
the borders of the current laws governing the use of force will be pushed.22 The
use of cyber tools to accomplish military operations, the development and
weaponization of nanotechnology, the linkage of virology to individual or
group DNA, the automation of weapons systems, and the development of
robotics all represent likely aspects of future armed conflicts whose effects on
the WPR have not yet been considered.
The WPR is not sufficiently clear with respect to its application to future
weapon systems. The triggering language of “in any case in which United
States Armed Forces are introduced—(1) into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances; [or] (2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign
nation,” was written in an era where the means and methods of armed conflict
were centered on humans interacting on a geographically limited battlefield.23
Though this will continue to be true in the future for most armed conflicts,
technologically advanced nations such as the United States are developing and
will continue to develop new weapons that will not require human interaction
in combat to be effective.24 The current language of the WPR is ineffective to
ensure Congressional participation in the President’s use of these weapons. If
Congress intends the WPR to act as a restraint on presidential use of force in
the future, the WPR needs to be amended to clarify that “boots on the ground”
and hostilities are not the only required trigger to invoke the WPR’s
provisions.

20 RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: AFTER THIRTY-SIX YEARS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV. 6–9 (2010).
21 Newton, supra note 9, at 181.
22 See Eric Talbot Jensen, The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict: Ostriches, Butterflies, and
Nanobots, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 253 (2014).
23 See 50 U.S.C. § 1543.
24 Because this Article will deal specifically with U.S. domestic legislation known as the War Powers
Resolution, the paper will focus on emerging technologies and weapons within the context of the United
States.
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Part I of this paper will highlight some of the advancing technologies and
resulting current and future weapons systems that the United States has and
will have in its arsenal. Part II will briefly discuss the passage of the War
Powers Resolution and the demonstrated intent of Congress. Part II will then
address the triggering language of the WPR, including its original
understanding, and its subsequent evolution. Part III will demonstrate the
inadequacy of the current language of the WPR to effectively apply to future
weapon systems. Part IV will analyze various proposed amendments to the
WPR, show how they also do not account for future technologies, and then
propose a simple amendment to the WPR that will accomplish this important
objective.
I. FUTURE ARMED CONFLICT
It would be nearly impossible to accurately guess what weapons
technologies will be developed in the future, or even in the next few decades.
However, what does seem clear is that weapons technology is advancing at a
rapid rate and that this trend will continue.25 Many of these advancing
technologies will be so qualitatively different from current means and methods
of warfare that they will undercut the fundamental understanding of the WPR
and Congress’s intent to regulate the use of military force by the President.
The following section will briefly describe some of the known areas of
advancing technology in weapons. The focus will be on discussing weapons
that will likely raise important questions as to the applicability and
effectiveness of the WPR as those weapons are put into use. The means of

25 There is no way to adequately describe even a small number of the new technologies that will become
a common part of armed conflict in the future; see Duncan Blake & Joseph Imburgia, “Bloodless Weapons”?
The Need to Conduct Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications of Defining Them as
Weapons, 66 A.F. L. REV. 157 (2010); David Axe, Military Must Prep Now for ‘Mutant’ Future, Researchers
Warn, WIRED.COM (Dec. 31, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/12/pentagon-preparemutant-future/; Patrick Lin, Could Human Enhancement Turn Soldiers Into Weapons That Violate
International Law? Yes, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/print/2013/01/
could-human-enhancement-turn-soldiers-into-weapons-that-violate-international-law-yes/266732/;
Anna
Mulrine, Unmanned Drone Attacks and Shape-shifting Robots: War’s Remote-control Future, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/1022/Unmanned-drone-attacks-andshape-shifting-robots-War-s-remote-control-future; Noah Schachtman, Suicide Drones, Mini Blimps and 3D
Printers: Inside the New Army Arsenal, WIRED.COM (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/
2012/11/new-army-arsenal/; Noah Schachtman, DARPA’s Magic Plan: ‘Battlefield Illusions’ To Mess With
Enemy Minds, WIRED.COM, (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/darap-magic/; Mark
Tutton, The Future of War: Far-out Battle Tech, CNN.COM (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/15/
tech/innovation/darpa-future-war/index.html.
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warfare will be addressed first, followed by a shorter section on methods of
warfare.
A. Means of Warfare
The means of warfare, or armed conflict as it is more generally described in
modern usage, refers to the implements used to conduct the conflict.26 More
broadly, they can be thought of as the weapons of warfare, such as rifles,
artillery shells, or bombs.27 As the products of advancing research, future
weapons will be more lethal, more accurate, more survivable, and less
expensive. Most importantly for this article, they will also be less human. In
other words, as these emerging weapons do their harm, they will create greater
distance, both in time and space, between the weapon’s deleterious effects and
the human that creates, authorizes, initiates, or uses them. The following
examples demonstrate the point and provide instructive illustrations as to why
the WPR is becoming less and less effective as a means of ensuring
Congressional input on the use of military force, as will be discussed in Part
III.
1. Drones
Drones are a quickly developing technology whose use has been widely
documented.28 Both armed and unarmed drones are being used in combat
zones, along borders,29 and across the world.30 Within the U.S. drones are
being used by local law enforcement and the U.S. Federal Aviation

26

See Blake & Imburgia, supra note 25, at 168–69.
Id. at 170.
28 See Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone
Program in Pakistan, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 12 (2011); Mark Bowden, The Killing Machines: How to Think About
Drones, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2013), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/thekilling-machines-how-to-think-about-drones/309434/; see also, Tony Rock, Yesterday’s Laws, Tomorrow’s
Technology: The Laws of War and Unmanned Warfare, 24 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 39 (2011) (discussing the use of
drones and their legal implications).
29 Perry Chiaramonte, UN using drones to monitor Congo border, fleet to grow this spring, FOX NEWS,
(Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/03/01/un-using-drones-to-monitor-congo-border-fleetto-grow-this-spring/; Tim Gaynor, U.S. drones to watch entire Mexico border from September 1, REUTERS
(Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/30/us-usa-immigration-security-idUSTRE67T5DK20
100830.
30 Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 28; Craig Whitlock, U.S Expands Secret Intelligence Operations in
Africa, WASH. POST (June 13, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-13/world/35462541_1_
burkina-faso-air-bases-sahara.
27
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Administration has been tasked with determining how to regulate the use of
domestic airspace for drones.31
As the technology continues to develop, drones’ lethality and capability
will dramatically increase, while their size and detectability will dramatically
decrease.32 In combination with other advancing technologies discussed below,
the United States will soon be able to deploy miniature (microscopic) drones in
large quantities from great distances and which have significant lethal and nonlethal effects. Their potential for affecting future warfare has caused P.W.
Singer to describe drones as a “game changer” on the level with the atomic
bomb.33
Important for this article, drones can be remotely guided34 or even
preprogrammed.35 No human need be anywhere close to the drone as it takes
its lethal or non-lethal action. Rather, large numbers of drones can be engaged
in significant actions at great distances and at delayed times from the pilots
who both fly the drones and direct the action.36 This resulting lack of risk to
U.S. military personnel has already been the topic of much discussion,
especially among ethicists who worry that the “low-cost” of war will make it
too easy of an option.37 These same characteristics will also cause concerns

31 WELLS C. BENNETT, UNMANNED AT ANY SPEED 55 (2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
research/papers/2012/12/14-drones-bennett.
32 Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves With Drones, Some Tiny as Bugs, N.Y. TIMES (June
19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/20drones.html?pagewanted=all.
33 US Expert Discusses Robotics in War, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/
lateline/content/2012/s3442876.htm.

I think the way to think about [unmanned drones] is they are a game-changer when it comes to
both technology, but also war and the politics that surrounds war. This is an invention that’s on
the level of gunpowder or the computer or the steam engine, the atomic bomb. It’s a game
changer.
Id.

34 Bryony Jones, Flying Lessons: learning how to pilot a drone, CNN (June 30, 2011, 8:32 AM), http://
www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/06/29/drone.flying.lesson/.
35 Mike Hanlan, Little Bird–Helicopter Without a Pilot, GIZMAG (July 12, 2006), http://www.gizmag.
com/go/5863/.
36 See Patrick Lin, Drone-Ethics Briefing: What a Leading Robot Expert Told the CIA, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 2011), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/print/2011/12/drone-ethics-briefing-what-aleading-robot-expert-told-the-cia/250060/.
37 See, e.g., id. (“Some critics have worried that UAV operators—controlling drones from half a world
away—could become detached and less caring about killing, given the distance, and this may lead to more
unjustified strikes and collateral damage.”).
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with respect to the intended purposes of the WPR,38 as will be discussed in Part
III.
2. Cyber
Cyber tools are already demonstrating their effectiveness. Recent cyber
incidents include facilitating the theft of millions of dollars from automated
teller machines,39 state-sponsored theft of corporate trade secrets,40 and the
disruption of government communication systems during a military attack.41
The infamous STUXNET42 malware “infected about 100,000 computers
worldwide, including more than 60,000 in Iran, more than 10,000 in Indonesia
and more than 5,000 in India”43 in the process of destroying almost 1,000
centrifuges in an Iranian nuclear facility.44 The recent Flame malware45 was
designed to gather immense amounts of secretive government data and
“exceeds all other known cyber menaces to date” according to Kapersky Lab
and CrySys Lab which discovered the malware.46
Similar to drones, cyber operations have also been written about
extensively,47 including the recently published Tallinn Manual on the

38 See Julia L. Chen, Restoring Constitutional Balance: Accommodating the Evolution of War, 53 B. C.
L. Rev. 1767, 1788–90 (2012).
39 Marc Santora, In Hours, Thieves Took $45 Million in A.T.M. Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2013), at
A1.
40 Lee Ferran, Report Fingers Chinese Military Unit in US Hack Attacks, ABC NEWS (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/mandiant-report-fingers-chinese-military-us-hack-attacks/story?id=18537307.
41 Collin Allan, Direct Participation in Hostilities from Cyberspace, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 174 n.5
(2013); Paulo Shakarian, The 2008 Russian Cyber Campaign Against Georgia, MIL. REV. 63 (Dec. 2011).
42 Amr Thabet, STUXNET Malware Analysis Paper, CODEPROJECT (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.
codeproject.com/Articles/246545/Stuxnet-Malware-Analysis-Paper.
43 Holger Stark, Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of Cyber War, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Aug. 8, 2011, 3:04 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mossad-s-miracle-weapon-stuxnet-virus-opens-new-era-of-cyberwar-a-778912.html. Admittedly, STUXNET was governed by the jus ad bellum, but similar malware will
undoubtedly be used during armed conflict in the future. For an analysis of STUXNET under the jus in bello,
see Jeremy Richmond, Evolving Battlefields: Does STUXNET Demonstrate a Need for Modifications to the
Law of Armed Conflict?, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 842 (2012).
44 See Atika Shubert, Cyber Warfare: A Different Way to Attack Iran’s Reactors, CNN (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/08/tech/iran-stuxnet/.
45 Full Analysis of Flame’s Command and Control Servers, SECURELIST (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:00 PM),
http://www.securelist.com/en/blog/750/Full_Analysis_of_Flame_s_Command_Control_servers.
46 David Gilbert, Flame Virus Update: UK Servers Used to Control Malware, INT’L BUS. TIMES NEWS
(June 6, 2012), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/349195/20120606/flame-update-servers-shut-down.htm.
47 E.g. Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Distinction in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. &
DEV. L.J. 143 (1999); Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer Network Attack, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 391
(2010); MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., 76 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND
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International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tallinn Manual) which
provides rules and commentary on the application of the law of armed conflict
(LOAC) to cyber operations.48 Many nations are embracing the capabilities
that cyber tools provide49 because of their bloodless nature50 and the increased
set of targets to which such tools provide access.51
In addition to nations, cyber tools are increasingly available to non-state
actors. Individual hackers have been known to develop sophisticated malware
and cause great damage.52 Large markets have now developed around the
production and sale of cyber tools,53 making them available to the highest
bidder at very reasonable prices. One of the unique characteristics of cyber
tools is their propensity to be reengineered or “copycatted.”54 As reported by
David Hoffman,
Langner [who first discovered the STUXNET malware] warns that
such malware can proliferate in unexpected ways: “Stuxnet’s attack
code, available on the Internet, provides an excellent blueprint and
jump-start for developing a new generation of cyber warfare
weapons.” He added, “Unlike bombs, missiles, and guns, cyber
weapons can be copied. The proliferation of cyber weapons cannot be
controlled. Stuxnet-inspired weapons and weapon technology will
soon be in the hands of rogue nation states, terrorists, organized
crime, and legions of leisure hackers.”55

INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences From Knock-on Effects: A
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145, 1150 (2003).
48 THE TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 4–5 (Michael
N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (hereinafter THE TALLINN MANUAL).
49 Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Casualties, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 249, 249 (2010); Graham H. Todd, Armed Attack in Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an
Asymmetric Definition, 64 A.F. L. REV. 65, 96 (2009).
50 Blake & Imburgia, supra note 25, at 181–83.
51 See generally THE TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48; Eric Talbot Jensen, President Obama and the
Changing Cyber Paradigm, 37 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 5049 ( 2011).
52 E.g., David Kleinbard & Richard Richtmyer, U.S. Catches ‘Love’ Virus, CNNMONEY (May 5, 2000,
11:33 PP), http://money.cnn.com/2000/05/05/technology/loveyou/.
53 Michael Riley & Ashley Vance, Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race, Bloomberg Businessweek
(July 20, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-race-07212011.html.
54 Mark Clayton, From the man who discovered Stuxnet, dire warnings one year later, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0922/From-the-man-who-discoveredStuxnet-dire-warnings-one-year-later.
55 David E. Hoffman, The New Virology, 185 FOREIGN POL’Y 78, 78 (2011), available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/the_new_virology?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=fu
ll.
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Because of the proliferation of cyber tools across all levels of society, the
United States will continue to need to develop and use cyber capabilities to
conduct both defensive protective measures, but also offensive cyber actions.
In fact, the Air Force recently announced that it has classified six specific
cyber tools as “weapons”56 and Congress recently provided authorization for
the United Stated Department of Defense (“DoD”) to conduct “offensive
operations in cyberspace.”57 Additionally, U.S. Cyber Command, General
Keith Alexander, announced in March 2013 that the Pentagon will have 13
offensive cyber teams by fall 2015.58
In addition, the Guardian newspaper recently reported that President
Obama “ordered his senior national security and intelligence officials to draw
up a list of potential overseas targets for U.S. cyber-attacks,”59 and the
Washington Post reported that “U.S. intelligence services carried out 231
offensive spy-operations in 2011.”60
Cyber weapons are, and will continue to be, a part of the United States’
military arsenal. As will be seen in Part III, the distance in both time and space
by which these cyber tools can be effectively used demonstrates the
ineffectiveness of the WPR in future armed conflicts.61
3. Robots and Autonomous Weapons
The use of robotics and autonomous systems by the United States military
has not progressed as far or as fast as that of drones and cyber operations, but
their use is clearly increasing. As noted by Singer,

56 Andrea Shalal-Esa, Six U.S. Air Force Cyber Capabilities Designated “Weapons”, REUTERS (Apr. 8,
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/net-us-cyber-airforce-weapons-idUSBRE93801B20130409.
57 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, Sec. 954, 125 Stat.
1298, 354 (2011).
58 Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Creating Teams to Launch Cyberattacks as Threat Grows (Mar. 12,
2013), WASH. POST, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-12/world/37645469_1_new-teams-nationalsecurity-threat-attacks.
59 Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, Obama Orders US to Draw Up Overseas Target Lists for
Cyber-Attacks, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/obama-chinatargets-cyber-overseas.
60 Barton Gellman & Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Spy Agencies Mounted 231 Offensive Cyber-Operations in
2011, Documents Show, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-documents-show/2013/08/30/d090
a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html.
61 See also Chen, supra note 38, at 1790–92.
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When the U.S. military went into Iraq in 2003, it had only a handful
of robotic planes, commonly called “drones” but more accurately
known as “unmanned aerial systems.” Today, we have more than
7,000 of these systems in the air, ranging from 48-foot-long Predators
to micro-aerial vehicles that a single soldier can carry in a backpack.
The invasion force used zero “unmanned ground vehicles,” but now
we have more than 12,000, such as the lawnmower-size Packbot and
Talon, which help find and defuse deadly roadside bombs.62

Thomas Adams, a retired Army Colonel, argues that “[f]uture Robotic
weapons ‘will be too fast, too small, too numerous and will create an
environment too complex for humans to direct,’” and “[i]nnovations with
robots ‘are rapidly taking us to a place where we may not want to go, but
probably are unable to avoid.’”63
The development and use of autonomous systems, including robots,
unarmed and armed unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles,64 auto-response
systems such as armed unmanned sentry stations,65 and a host of other similar
weapon systems is clearly increasing.66 In addition to the United States, “there
are 43 other nations that are also building, buying and using military robotics
today.”67 In 2005, a published military report “suggested autonomous robots
on the battlefield will be the norm within 20 years,”68 and a recent DoD report
titled Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, stated that it
“envisions unmanned systems seamlessly operating with manned systems

62 Peter W. Singer, We, Robot, SLATE (May 19, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
war_stories/2010/05/we_robot.html; see also Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves With Drones,
Some Tiny as Bugs, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/20drones.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
63 Robots on Battlefield: Robotic Weapons Might be the Way of the Future, But They Raise Ethical
Questions About the Nature of Warfare, TOWNSVILLE BULL. (Sept. 18, 2009).
64 Damien Gayle, Rise of the Machine: Autonomous killer robots ‘could be developed in 20 years’,
DAILYMAIL (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2235680/Rise-MachinesAutonomous-killer-robots-developed-20-years.html.
65 Jonathan D. Moreno, Robot Soldiers Will Be a Reality—And a Threat, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2012,
6:07 PM ), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304203604577396282717616136.html.
66 John Markoff, U.S. aims for robots to earn their stripes on the battlefield, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE
(Nov. 27, 2010).
67 Steve Kanigher, Author talks about military robotics and the changing face of war, LAS VEGAS SUN
(Mar. 17, 2011, 2:01 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/mar/17/military-robotics-and-changingface-war/.
68 P.W. Singer, In the Loop? Armed Robots and the Future of War, DEFENSE INDUSTRY DAILY (Jan. 28,
2009,
20:09),
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/In-the-Loop-Armed-Robots-and-the-Future-of-War05267/.
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while gradually reducing the degree of human control and decision making
required for the unmanned portion of the force structure.”69
Current controversy has erupted around autonomous systems when the
DoD issued Autonomy in Weapon Systems,70 a directive that applies to the
“design, development, acquisition, testing, fielding, and employment of
autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including guided
munitions that can independently select and discriminate targets.”71 The
Directive deals specifically with the autonomous nature of future systems and
states that “It is DoD policy that . . . [a]utonomous and semi-autonomous
weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to
exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”72
Immediately following the issuance of the DoD Directive, Human Rights
Watch published a report73 calling for a multilateral treaty that would “prohibit
the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons.”74 This
report has, in turn, been assailed by law of war experts who attack the
underlying legal and practical assumptions it contains.75
At this point, it is unclear how the issues surrounding robots and
autonomous weapon systems will all resolve, but it seems very unlikely that
the military will abandon such a useful tool. In fact, it seems much more likely
that research, development, and employment of robots and autonomous
systems, including autonomous weapon systems, will continue to increase and
become an even larger portion of the military arsenal. The employment of
these non-human weapons has significant potential impact on the effectiveness
of the WPR, as will be discussed below.
69

at
pdf.

70

U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP FY2011-2036 (2011), available
http://www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/Unmanned%20Systems%20Integrated%20Roadmap%20FY2011-2036.

U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS (Nov. 21, 2012).
The Directive followed a DoD Defense Science Board Task Force Report that was issued in July of 2012. U.S.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS (July 2012), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf.
71 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE No. 3000.09 § 2(a)(2), The Directive does not apply to
“autonomous and semi-autonomous cyberspace systems for cyberspace operations; unarmed, unmanned
platforms; unguided munitions; munitions manually guided by the operator (e.g. laser- or wire-guided
munitions); mines; or unexploded explosive ordnance.” Id. § 2(b).
72 Id. § 4(a).
73 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (2012), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf.
74 Id. at 5.
75 See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A
Reply to the Critics, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1 (2013).
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4. Nanotechnology
According to a U.S. government website, “[n]anotechnology is the
understanding and control of matter at the nanoscale, at dimensions between
approximately 1 and 100 nanometers, where unique phenomena enable novel
applications.”76 In the United States, the National Science and Technology
Council oversees nanotechnology development with the goal to “expedite[] the
discovery, development and deployment of nanoscale science, engineering,
and technology to serve the public good through a program of coordinated
research and development aligned with the missions of the participating
agencies.”77 China and Russia are also “openly investing significant amounts
of money in nanotechnology.”78
The U.S. DoD was quick to recognize the potential benefits of
nanotechnology. In 2006, Forbes reported:
The Department of Defense has spent over $1.2 billion on
nanotechnology research through the National Nanotech Initiative
since 2001. The DOD believed in nano long before the term was
mainstream. According to Lux Research, the DOD has given grants
totaling $195 million to 809 nanotech-based companies starting as
early as 1988. Over the past ten years, the number of nanotech grants
has increased tenfold.79

Potential applications of nanotechnology to military purposes are
numerous. Blake and Imburgia, both military lawyers, have written:
Scientists believe nanotechnology can be used to develop controlled
and discriminate biological and nerve agents; invisible, intelligence
gathering devices that can be used for covert activities almost
anywhere in the world; and artificial viruses that can enter into the
human body without the individual’s knowledge. So called
“nanoweapons” have the potential to create more intense laser
technologies as well as self-guiding bullets that can direct themselves
to a target based on artificial intelligence. Some experts also believe
nanotechnology possesses the potential to attack buildings as a
76

What it is and How it Works, NANO.GOV, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what (last visited Mar. 5,

2013).
77

NNI Vision, Goals, and Objectives, NANO.GOV, http://www.nano.gov/about-nni/what/vision-goals
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
78 Blake & Imburgia, supra note 25, at 180.
79 Josh Wolfe & Dan van den Bergh, Nanotech Takes on Homeland Terror, FORBES.COM (Aug. 14, 2006,
6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2006/08/11/nanotech-terror-cepheid-homeland-in_jw_0811soapbox_inl.
html.
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“swarm of nanoscale robots programmed only to disrupt the electrical
and chemical systems in a building,” thus avoiding the collateral
damage a kinetic strike on that same building would cause.80

Foreseeable weapons advances from nanotechnology include improving the
strength and longevity of machinery,81 advances in stealth technology,82
allowing the creation of more powerful and efficient bombs,83 and the
miniaturization of nuclear weapons.84 Perhaps most importantly for this article,
nanotechnology will likely eventually allow for the creation of microscopic
nanobots that can not only act as sensors to gather information, but also serve
as delivery systems for lethal toxins or genomic alterers into human bodies.85
Nanotechnology will make weapons smaller, more mobile, and more
potent. It will provide easier, quicker, and more accurate means of collecting
information. It will allow greater range, effect, and lethality. And it will do all
of this at great distances from any human influence and with kinetic effects
that cover the full spectrum of possibilities. The WPR currently does not seem
to encompass the military application of such technology.
5. Virology and Genomics
These two areas of advancing technologies are early in their development.
Insofar as they overlap with biological weapons, such use by nations has
already been internationally prohibited.86 However, their increased
accessibility to the general public has raised grave concerns amongst
80

Blake & Imburgia, supra note 25, at 180 (citations omitted).
Benefits and Applications, NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INST., http://nano.gov/you/nanotechnologybenefits (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
82 Clay Dillow, Carbon Nanotube Stealth Paint Could Make Any Object Ultra-Black, POPSCI (Dec. 6,
2011, 12:15 BST), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-12/paint-imbued-carbon-nanotubes-couldmake-any-object-absorb-broad-spectrum-light.
83 Adrian Blomfield, Russian Army ‘Tests the Father of All Bombs’, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 12, 2007, 12:01
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1562936/Russian-army-tests-the-father-of-all-bombs.html.
84 Military Uses of Nanotechnology: The Future of War, THENANOAGE.COM, http://www.thenanoage.
com/military.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
85 Scientists and the University of California, Berkeley, are already working on the Micromechanical
Flying Insect Project. Micromechanical Flying Insect, U. CAL. BERKELEY, http://robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/
~ronf/mfi.html/index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013); Nanotech Weaponry, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE
NANOTECHNOLOGY (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2004/02/nanotech_weapon.html;
Caroline Perry, Mass-Production Sends Robot Insects Flying, LIVE SCI. (Apr. 18, 2012, 5:51 PM),
http://www.livescience.com/19773-mini-robot-production-nsf-ria.html.
86 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No.
8062.
81
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successive United States administrations; to the extent that natural or synthetic
viruses and similar naturally occurring organisms do not fall within the
proscriptions of international law, they provide potentially potent weapons or
weapons platforms, especially in combination with advances in genomics.87
Additionally, such international regulation only applies to States,88 and any
impact on non-state actors depends on domestic implementation of the Treaty
provisions and effective enforcement, normally through criminal actions that
only take effect after the crime has occurred.89
Genomics is the “study of genes and their function.”90 The rapid advances
in genomics91 have not only provided numerous benefits for modern medicine
and science in general, but have also provided the opportunity for significant
weapons advancements. “A couple of decades ago, it took three years to learn
how to clone and sequence a gene, and you earned a PhD in the process. Now,
thanks to ready-made kits you can do the same in less than three days . . . the
cost of sequencing DNA has plummeted, from about $100,000 for reading a
million letters, or base pairs, of DNA code in 2001, to around 10 cents
87 Will S. Hylton, How Ready are We for Bioterrorism?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-for-bioterrorism.html?pagewanted=all; BOB GRAHAM
ET AL., WORLD AT RISK: THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND
TERRORISM, xv (2008), available at http://www.absa.org/leg/WorldAtRisk.pdf; A former director at the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, argues that “What took me three weeks in a
sophisticated laboratory in a top-tier medical school 20 years ago, with millions of dollars in equipment, can
essentially be done by a relatively unsophisticated technician. . . . A person at a graduate-school level has all
the tools and technologies to implement a sophisticated program to create a bioweapon.” Wil S. Hylton,
Warning: There’s Not Nearly Enough Of This Vaccine To Go Around, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Oct.
30, 2011, at MM26. Similarly, Michael Daly writes that “there is already information in public databases that
could be used to generate highly pathogenic biological warfare (BW) agents.” Michael J. Daly, The Emerging
Impact of Genomics on the Development of Biological Weapons: Threats and Benefits Posed by Engineered
Extremophiles, 21 CLINICS IN LABORATORY MED. 619, 621 (2001), available at http://www.usuhs.edu/pat/
deinococcus/pdf/clinicsLabMedicineVol21No3.pdf.
88 See generally, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583,
T.I.A.S. No. 8062.
89 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1540, paras. 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (calling on member States
to develop domestic procedures to enforce treaty provisions relating to non-state actors’ use of nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons).
90 MedicineNet.com, Definition of Genomics, (Oct. 26, 2014) at http://www.medterms.com/script/main/
art.asp?articlekey=23242.
91 David E. Hoffman, The New Virology: The future of war by other means, FOREIGN POLICY, p. 78,
March/April 2011, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/the_new_virology?print=
yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full where the author states, “One thing is certain: The technology for probing
and manipulating life at the genetic level is accelerating. . . . But the inquiry itself highlighted the rapid pace of
change in manipulating biology. Will rogue scientists eventually learn how to use the same techniques for
evil?”
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today.”92 The ability to tailor a weapon to the exact DNA of your intended
target would allow for precision targeting in a way not formerly possible.
For example, Andrew Hessel, Marc Goodman, and Steven Kotler, writing
recently in the Atlantic, proposed a hypothetical where a virus that was
genetically coded to the President of the United States was created and
transmitted through unwitting individuals with lethal effect on only the
President.93 Advances in genomics, particularly linked to similar advances in
virology and nanotechnology, move this hypothetical from the world of
science fiction to the realm of potential weapons.
As with the prior weapons discussed in this section, viral and genomic
weapons have effects at great distances, in both time and space, from their
initiator. There is no requirement for the human designer or user to be on the
same continent when the lethal effect occurs. Furthermore, the pinpoint
accuracy of a genetically coded weapon could limit the scale in such a way as
to stay far below the level of armed conflict.
B. Methods of Warfare
In contrast to means of warfare, the method of warfare is not about the
weapon or means of warfare itself, but about how warfare is conducted—the
tactics of warfare.94 For example, the use of camouflage is considered a ruse95
and is a method of warfare. Advancing technologies will allow for new and
innovative methods of warfare that will raise interesting legal issues. One in
particular is worth mentioning here—latent attacks.
1. Latent Attacks
Latent attacks are “characterized by the placing or embedding of some
weapon in a place or position where it will not be triggered until signaled
92 Charisius, Friebe, and Karberg, Becoming Biohackers: Learning the Game, BBC (Jan. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130122-how-we-became-biohackers-part-1.
93 Andrew Hessel, Marc Goodman & Steven Kotler, Hacking the President’s DNA, ATLANTIC
MAGAZINE (Nov. 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/hacking-the-presidentsdna/309147/.
94 Methods of Warfare, PRC MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE
WARFARE, http://www.ihlresearch.org/amw/manual/section-a-definitions/v (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
95 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc A/32/144, art. 37.2 (June 8, 1977); see also GEOFFREY
CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 223–24 (2012) (discussing ruses
versus perfidy).
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sometime in the future or activated by some future action.”96 The eventual
attack may be triggered by a remote signal or specific occurrence and may
even be triggered by the victim himself.97 For example, consider viral genetic
material that is implanted by a nanobot into the intended victim far in advance
of a future attack. The latent but lethal genetic material may only be activated
upon some signal by the attacker or some other event, potentially by an
unknowing third party or the victim himself, such as ingesting some supposed
antidote. Additionally, the triggering event may never occur, but the potential
would always be there.
Latent computer attacks are already well documented.98 Embedded source
code in the hardware of computer components or software found on computers
would provide an adversary with a powerful future weapon.99 For example,
consider that the United States sells F-16 aircraft to numerous countries
throughout the world. The United States could certainly implant in the
computer functions of that aircraft some computer code that will not allow the
F-16 to engage aircraft that it identifies as belonging to the U.S. military. In
fact, if the U.S. has this capability, it may be irresponsible to not take such preemptive actions. As the largest producer of weapons worldwide,100 and one of
the largest exporters,101 latent attacks should be an important consideration for
the U.S. military industrial complex.
The capability to implant, hide and trigger latent attacks is technologically
dependent. But as the ability to do so continues to develop, it seems clear that
the United States and other technologically capable nations, would likely use
such technology, even against current allies, as a hedge against future changes
in the geopolitical situation. As with the means of warfare discussed above,
this method of attack would take place in time and space at great distances
from the initial human action, taking it outside the current regulation of the
WPR.
96

Jensen, supra note 22, at 309.
Id.
98 Steve Stecklow, U.S. Nuclear Lab Removes Chinese Tech Over Security Fears, REUTERS (Jan. 7,
2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/us-huawei-alamos-idUSBRE90608B20130107;
Jayadeva Ranade, China and the Latent Cyber Threat, 1 National Defense and Aerospace Power 1 (2010).
99 Wary of Naked Force, Israel Eyes Cyberwar on Iran, REUTERS, (July 7, 2009), http://www.ynetnews.
com/articles/0,7340,L-3742960,00.html.
100 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military
services companies in the world, excluding China, 2012, available at http://www.sipri.org/research/
armaments/production/Top100.
101 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, TIV of arms exports from all, 2012-2013, available
at http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php.
97
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****
In all of these cases, where the human connection is attenuated and the type
of action is different from the normal kinetic model, there are significant
impacts on the application of the WPR. It is to this topic that the paper now
turns.
II. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
The WPR is a federal law intended to inhibit the President’s ability to use
military force in a situation of armed conflict without involving Congress.102
Both its constitutionality and its practicality have been seriously questioned in
the past,103 including a very detailed discussion between the Executive and
Legislative branches in connection with United States’ support to military
operations in Libya in 2011.104 The next part will provide a brief historical
background. The part will be followed by an introduction to the text of the
Resolution, with emphasis on those portions pertinent to the thesis of this
article. Issues raised by those specific provisions will then be discussed.
A. History
In the early 1970’s, discontent with the Vietnam War was spreading
throughout the citizenry of the United States105 and the Congress. Congress
demonstrated its frustration with the situation by repealing the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, which was the Congressional grant of authority for the war.106
With the publication of the Pentagon Papers107 in June 1971, Congress felt
betrayed by successive Presidential administrations that, it appeared, had not
been keeping Congress fully informed of the military actions in Indochina.108
102

WPR, sec. 2(a).
GRIMMETT, supra note 20, at 6; BAKER ET AL., supra note 8, at 24; Fisher & Adler, supra note 12, at
10–14; Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch III, The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A “Joint
Decision” Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367, 385–90 (1988).
104 See e.g. Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya
Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A16; Stephen G. Rademaker, Congress and the Myth of the 60-Day
Clock, WASH. POST (May 24, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-24/opinions/35233150_1_
libya-operation-war-powers-resolution-president-obama.
105 Joseph Carroll, The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison, GALLUP (June 15, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
11998/iraqvietnam-comparison.aspx.
106 Pub. L. No 91-672, Sec. 12, 84 Stat. 2053 (1971).
107 The Pentagon Papers, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specialreports/
pentagon-papers/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
108 Hedrick Smith, Mitchell Seeks to Halt Series on Vietnam, but Times Refuses, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
1971, at 1.
103
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In response, Congress passed the Mansfield Amendment109 which “declared to
be the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest possible date all
military operations of the United States in Indochina.”110
Despite this Congressional action, military involvement continued, and
Congress turned to another source for stopping the war—funding. On May 31,
1973, Congress passed a bill telling the President that “None of the funds
herein appropriated under this act or heretofore appropriated under any other
act may be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities in, over
or from off the shores of Cambodia or in or over Laos by United States
forces.”111 President Nixon vetoed the bill but was forced to the bargaining
table.112 After negotiations, Congress passed a Joint Resolution which the
President did not veto which stated “Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated
may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities
by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.”113
During this same period, a stream of judicial cases flooded the Courts from
citizens,114 members of the military,115 and eventually members of Congress.116
The results of these cases were mixed, and no clear standard was achieved as
to the differing roles of Congress and the President in the use of the military.
Though President Nixon complied with the Joint Resolution by ceasing
bombing on August 14, 1973, Congress was left dissatisfied with their role in
the Vietnam War and felt a great need to reign in Presidential power to engage
the military in hostilities.117 That chance came in October 1973.118

109

Pub. L. No. 92-156, Sec. 601(a), 85 Stat. 423. 430 (1971).
Id.
111 29 Cong. Q. Almanac 102 (1973).
112 D.H.H., The War Powers Resolution: A Tool for Balancing Power Through Negotiation, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1037, 1039 (1984).
113 Pub. L. No 93-52, Sec 108. 87 Stat. 130 (July 1, 1073).
114 See, e.g., Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); Campen
v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
115 See Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Orlando v. Laird,
443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665–66 (D.C.
Cir.).
116 See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
117 See Fisher & Adler, supra note 12, at 1, 4, 10.
118 Id. at 1–6.
110
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As early as May 3, 1973, Representative Zablocki introduced a Joint
Resolution that would require the President to work more closely with
Congress when initiating military actions.119 The House passed the proposed
legislation on July 18120 and the Senate on July 20.121 It was reported to the
Joint Conference Committee on October 4,122 and agreed to by the Senate on
October 10123 and the House on October 12.124 The legislation was then sent to
the President who vetoed it on October 24.125
The President raised several issues in his veto,126 including the claim that
the legislation was clearly unconstitutional because it “would attempt to take
away, by mere legislative act, authorities which the President has properly
exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years.”127 President Nixon
further argued that the legislation “would seriously undermine this Nation’s
ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis.”128 He
also chided the Congress for trying to set up automatic cut-offs of authority
without requiring particular action by Congress, arguing that “[i]n [his] view,
the proper way for the Congress to make known its will on such foreign policy
questions is through a positive action.”129
Many of President Nixon’s arguments remain pertinent today in the
continuing discussion of the constitutionality, as well as prudence, of the War
Powers Resolution.130 Nevertheless, an emboldened Congress131 overrode the
119

H.R.J. Res. 542 93rd Cong. 1973, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/
STATUTE-87-Pg555.pdf.
120 Bill Summary & Status 93rd Congress (1973–1974) H.J. Res. 542 All Information, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d093:HJ00542:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Nov.
12, 2013).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.; Veto of War Powers Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1285 (Oct. 24, 1973).
126 Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 5 PUB. PAPERS 893, 893–95 (Oct. 24, 1973).
127 Id. at 893.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 894–95.
130 See, e.g., The War Powers Resolution Debate Continues, CONST. DAILY (Sept. 4, 2013), http://blog.
constitutioncenter.org/2013/09/the-war-powers-resolution-debate-continues/ (describing both sides of the
current debate); Robert F. Turner, Why the War Powers Resolution Isn’t a Key Factor in the Syria Situation,
CONST. DAILY (Aug. 30, 2013), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2013/08/why-the-war-powers-resolutionisnt-a-key-factor-in-the-syria-situation/ (arguing that President Nixon’s arguments against the WPR are still
valid today).
131 See Michael A. Newton, Inadvertent Implications of the War Powers Resolution, 45 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 173, 179–80 (2012).
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President’s veto, and the War Powers Resolution became law on November 7,
1973.
Since the passage of the WPR, every President has questioned the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution as an “unconstitutional
infringement on the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief.”132 There is
only one instance when the President has mentioned the WPR in sending a
notification to Congress and that was after the event had occurred.133 There
have been numerous examples of President’s filing reports “consistent with”
their WPR obligations,134 but generally with at least implicit and often explicit
disclaimers as to the applicability of the WPR.135 As of 2012, “Presidents have
submitted 132 reports to Congress as a result of the War Powers Resolution.
Of these, President Ford submitted 4, President Carter 1, President Reagan 14,
President George H. W. Bush 7, President Clinton 60, President George W.
Bush 39, and President Barack Obama 11.”136
There have also been a number of instances where armed forces have been
deployed into potentially hostile environments, yet the President has not filed
any kind of a report with Congress.137 In at least some of these instances, the
President has determined not to file, based on an opinion of the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) which was issued with respect to the
deployment of U.S. military forces to Somalia in 1992.138 According to the
OLC, President Clinton did not need to consult with or report to Congress
132 See GRIMMETT, supra note 20, at 6; RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 2 (2012); see BAKER ET AL., supra note 8, at 26.
133 See GRIMMETT, supra note 20, at 2; see BAKER ET AL., supra note 8, at 2 (referring to the 1975 seizure
of the Mayaguez and the President’s filing “cited section 4(a)(1), which triggers the time limit, . . . [but] in this
case the military action was completed and U.S. armed forces had disengaged from the area of conflict when
the report was made.”).
134 See generally Letter from Barack Obama, U.S. President, to John Boehner, U.S. Speaker of the House
(June 14, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/14/letter-presidentregarding-war-powers-resolution (regarding the War Powers Resolution); Letter to Congressional Leaders
Reporting on the Deployment of United States Military Personnel as Part of the Kosovo International Security
Force, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1544, 1544 (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pg1544.pdf; Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Situation in Somalia, 1
PUB. PAPERS 836, 836 (June 10, 1993); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Conflict, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 52, 52 (Jan. 18, 1991), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1991-book1/pdf/PPP-1991book1-doc-pg52.pdf; Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate on the United States Reprisal Against Iran, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1212, 1212 (Oct. 20, 1987), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/102087e.htm.
135 See GRIMMETT, supra note 20, at 2–3, 81.
136 See GRIMMETT, supra note 132, at 17.
137 See GRIMMETT, supra note 20, at 74.
138 Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, 16 OP. O.L.C. 6, 6 (1992).
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because “Attorneys General and this Office ‘have concluded that the President
has the power to commit United States troops abroad’ as well as to ‘take
military action, for the purpose of protecting national interests.’”139
A brief analysis of the text will demonstrate why the Executive objects to
Congress’s actions in the WPR.
B. Text
The WPR is divided into ten sections.140 Section 1 simply states the title,
and Section 2 gives the purpose and policy of the legislation, stating
Congress’s purpose is to “fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of
the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities.”141 This purpose statement stakes out Congress’s position early,
that the use of the military in armed conflict requires both branches of
government.
Section 3 is titled “Consultation” and states that “[t]he President in every
possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States
Armed Forces into hostilities.”142 This, of course, is made to address one of
Congress’s major complaints during the Vietnam War.
Section 4, which will be analyzed in detail in the next section, is one of the
most contentious, and the most significant for the purposes of this Article.143
The section is titled “Reporting” and establishes reporting requirements for the
President to the Congress under specified circumstances.144

139 Id. The OLC issued a similar opinion in relation to the 2011 military operation in Libya stating that
Congress’s authority under the “declare war” clause of the Constitution only applied to armed conflicts that
were “prolonged and substantial . . . typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk
over a substantial period.” Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 OP. O.L.C. 1, 24 available at http://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya_0.pdf. See also
Chen, supra note 38, at 1798; Newton, supra note 9, at 186.
140 See generally War Powers Resolution, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012).
141 Id. § 1541(a).
142 Id. § 1542.
143 Id. § 1543.
144 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2012).
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Section 5 also generates significant controversy, especially by those who
think the WPR is unconstitutional.145 It requires the President to terminate
hostilities and remove forces after sixty days without Congress taking any
further action.146 This contested language in the WPR is likely moot after the
1997 Supreme Court case of Raines v. Byrd,147 which will be discussed below.
Sections 6 and 7 are mostly procedural. Section 8 is titled “Interpretation”
and states that nothing in the resolution “shall be construed as granting any
authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would
not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.”148
Section 9 deals with the separability of provisions within the Resolution,149
and Section 10 is administrative.150
C. Issues
For the purposes of this paper, Section 4 contains the language at issue with
respect to future armed-conflict.151 However, Section 5 contains the most
onerous requirements on the President and represents the most invasive move
into what the President would claim as his exclusive authority as commanderin-chief.152 Therefore, a discussion of Section 5 is warranted first.
1. Section 5
As stated above, Section 5 of the WPR requires the President, in the
absence of action by Congress, to withdraw any “United States Armed Forces”
within sixty calendar days.153 President Nixon and subsequent Presidents have
145 See e.g. Stephen G. Rademaker, Congress and the Myth of the 60-Day Clock, WASH. POST, May 24,
2011,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-24/opinions/35233150_1_libya-operation-war-powersresolution-president-obama (discussing the controversy concerning Section 5 of the WPR).
146 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1545 (2012).
147 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
148 War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1547 (2012).
149 Id. § 1548.
150 Id. § 1541(c).
151 Id. § 1544.
152 See id. § 1545.
153 Id. § 1544(b) states:

Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to
section 1543 (a)(1) of this title, whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of
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argued that Congress cannot, by inaction, bind the President to take action with
respect to the use of armed forces.154 The President’s arguments seem to have
received Supreme Court approval in Raines v. Byrd,155 a Supreme Court case
concerning the Line Item Veto Act.156
In Raines v. Byrd, the members of Congress claimed that passage of the
line item veto “causes a type of institutional injury (the diminution of
legislative power), which necessarily damages all Members of Congress and
both Houses of Congress equally.”157 The Supreme Court responded that this
equated to a “loss of political power, not loss of any private right,”158 and
decided that “individual Members of Congress do not have sufficient ‘personal
stake’ in this dispute and have not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have
established Article III standing.”159
This decision became important with respect to the WPR in 1999 when
Representative Tom Campbell and other members of Congress filed a
complaint for declaratory relief to stop President Clinton’s action with respect
to the use of force in Kosovo.160 Campbell sought
a declaration from the judicial branch that the President, the head of
the executive branch, has violated the War Powers Clause of the
Constitution and the War Powers Resolution by conducting air strikes
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without congressional
authorization.161

United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be
submitted), unless the Congress
(1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed
Forces,
(2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or
(3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixtyday period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President
determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting
the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the
course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

See Rademaker, supra note 145.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
Line Item Veto Act of 1996, 2 U.S.C. §§ 691–692 (1996).
Raines, 521 U.S. at 821.
Id.
Id. at 830.
Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F.Supp.2d 34, 35 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d 203 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 39–40.
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The District Court, relying on Raines v. Byrd,162 held that
the courts will apply Raines and Coleman rigorously and will find
standing only in the clearest cases of vote nullification and genuine
impasse between the political branches. Under the circumstances
presented in this case, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiffs have
standing to bring this action, and the case therefore will be
dismissed.163

Similarly, on appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court again relied on Raines v. Byrd,
stating that “[t]he question whether congressmen have standing in federal court
to challenge the lawfulness of actions of the executive was answered, at least
in part, in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Raines v. Byrd.”164 The
Court went on to affirm the District Court’s holding and deny the appeal.165
As Professor Geoff Corn has argued, the decision in Raines “confirms a
consistent course followed by the judiciary when asked to adjudicate the
legality of presidential decisions to engage the United States Armed Forces in
hostilities: focus on whether such a challenge presents a truly ripe issue.”166
Corn goes on to argue that “[a] challenge will only be cognizable if Congress
manifests express opposition to such action. Thus, the legality of war making
is not based on a theory of unilateral presidential war power, but on a theory of
cooperative policy making by the two branches of government who share this
awesome authority.”167
These decisions fit nicely into Justice Jackson’s framework in his nowfamous concurrence in the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.168 In a
situation such as that contemplated by Section 5 where the Congress has taken
no action, the President can “only rely on his own independent powers.”169
Further, “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at

162 Id. at 40 (stating “[t]he legal landscape with respect to legislative standing was altered dramatically by
the Supreme Court in its first Line Item Veto decision, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849, 117
S. Ct. 2312 (1997). Virtually all of this Circuit’s prior jurisprudence on legislative standing now may be
ignored, and the separation of powers considerations previously evaluated under the rubric of ripeness or
equitable or remedial discretion now are subsumed in the standing analysis.”).
163 Id. at 45.
164 Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
165 Id. at 19.
166 Geoffrey S. Corn, Campbell v. Clinton: The “Implied Consent” Theory of Presidential War Power is
Again Validated, 161 MIL. L. REV. 202, 214 (1999).
167 Id. at 214–15.
168 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952).
169 Id. at 637.
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least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility.”170
In other words, the “practice of the President relying on the implied support
of Congress, Congress allowing the President to take war-making initiatives
and manifesting its consent through less than express authorization, and courts
declining to intervene so long as such support was evident”171 appears to take
any bite out of Section 5. As long as Congress does not take action, the
President is unlikely to have a Court intervene for non-compliance with the
withdrawal requirements of the WPR.
2. Section 4
Because Section 5 of the WPR is now assumed by most constitutional
scholars to be unconstitutional, the real power in the WPR is left to Section 4.
This section lays out the triggers for the application of the Resolution. The
section states:
SEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in
which United States Armed Forces are introduced—
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to
supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;
the president shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the
Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States
Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such
introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

170

Id.
Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers Resolution, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1149, 1190 (2001).
171
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(b) The President shall provide such other information as the
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional
responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to
the use of United States Armed Forces abroad
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into
hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this
section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to
be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress
periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on
the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event
shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six
months.172

This section sets up two threshold queries when determining whether the WPR
has been triggered: whether there is an introduction of armed forces; and
whether that introduction is into current or imminent “hostilities,” enters the
geographic space of another state while equipped for combat, or substantially
enlarges current deployments.173 These two queries will be discussed next.
a. Armed Forces
Because the involvement of the armed forces is a trigger for the WPR, it is
important to determine what “armed forces” means in U.S. domestic law in
order to analyze the application of the statute to potential future armed
conflicts and the ability of the WPR in its present form to effectively
accomplish the will of Congress with respect to their view of separation of
powers and the use of force.
Within the WPR itself, there is a provision that provides examples of what
Congress was targeting with the WPR. In 50 U.S.C. § 1547(c), the statute
states:
For purposes of this chapter, the term “introduction of United States
Armed Forces” includes the assignment of members of such armed
forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or
accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign
country or government when such military forces are engaged, or
there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged,
in hostilities.174
172
173
174

War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2012).
Id.
Id. § 1547(c).
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In defining the term “armed forces”175 for the purposes of the WPR, the
statute refers to “members of such armed forces,” seemingly making clear that
the assumption in the drafting was the involvement of actual personnel. As a
result, in Congressional usage, the use of the term armed forces has often been
substituted with by reference to putting “boots on the ground,” meaning
members of the armed forces being placed in the area of operations and at risk
from operations.
This usage is supported by the discussion of the WPR within Congress. For
example, while arguing in support of the Bill, Representative Annunzio stated:
We must create a situation, in law, where Americans can know that
their sons will be sent into hostilities which are clearly understood
and clearly accepted, and that unless that action has the approval of
Congress, it should not continue until it becomes, like the Vietnam
war, the longest war ever fought in our history, for a purpose still not
clearly understood, and against an enemy still not clearly defined.176

This reference to “sons” shows that the chief concern at the time was the
sending actual troops into harm’s way, not just military materials.
Representative Matsunaga who also supported the passage of the WPR,
stated: “First, it specifies that the President should consult in every possible
instance with congressional leaders before committing American troops to
hostilities.”177 The use of the word “troops” instead of “Armed Forces” seems
to be a clear indication that he was concerned about actual people in combat
and not just military materials.
These sentiments are also reflected by Representative Reid who argued that
“[T]his bill does provide a new mechanism whereby Congress and, indeed, any
Member of Congress can bring to a vote a preferential motion to end hostilities
where U.S. troops have been committed.”178 As with Representative
Matsunaga, the use of the word troops here indicates that the placing of actual
175 The term “armed forces” is defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101a(4): “The term ‘armed forces’ means the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.” While this is an important narrowing of the term, it is not
extremely helpful for the purposes of this analysis as it does not make a differentiation between personnel and
equipment. Many future technologies will not involve personnel in the same way current technologies do, but
be much more separated by time and distance.
176 119 CONG. REC. H6231, H6281 (daily ed. July 18, 1973) (statement of Rep. Annunzio). Mr. Annunzio,
also emphasized Congress’ important role in determining if “this Nation should involve itself in major
hostilities, committing large numbers of troops and large quantities of our national treasure.” Id. at H6280.
177 Id.
178 Id. at H6278.
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military members on the ground, or “boots on the ground,” was the prevailing
thought.
Members of the Senate were equally clear on this issue. Senator Griffin,
speaking of an amendment he proposed, stated, “[f]inally, provision is made in
the amendment so that any cessation of funding of operations would not
imperil the safety of the Armed Forces.”179 This appears to be a reference
focused on military personnel as opposed to materiel.
Additionally in a conversation on the record between Senator Johnston and
Senator Javits, Senator Johnston voiced some concern about whether the
language of the bill, which he said “speaks of introducing our troops in
hostilities,” would actually cover the actions in Vietnam, where “our troops
were originally sent there to guard an Air Force base.”180 Senator Javits replied
that there was imminent danger of hostilities when the troops were sent to
guard the Air Force Base and then the following exchange took place:
Senator Johnston: “Then the term ‘introducing hostilities’ means
introducing troops into the country if hostilities are taking place?”
Senator Javits: “That is exactly right.”
Senator Johnston: “And where they are not employed initially for
hostilities?”
Senator Javits: “That is precisely right.”181

The focus on sending “troops” into hostilities in the conversation regardless of
the status of the “hostilities” highlights that the Senators involved believed that
“troops” were the real concern meant to be covered by the statute, rather than
material or non-personnel items.
Two more examples are useful. Senator Tunney who spoke in support of
the bill stated, “This is not to deny that many situations might require an
American military presence. It is to stress that the methods selected by recent
American Presidents for introducing and maintaining American troops in
hostilities indicate that defects exist in the process by which war-making
decisions are made.”182 Similarly, Senator Huddleston who was a co-sponsor
of the WPR, in arguing the constitutional basis for the statute, said
179
180
181
182

119 CONG. REC. 14159, 14208 (daily ed. July 20, 1973).
Id. at 14208.
Id. at 14209.
Id. at 14215.
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The basis for legislative power in the committing of troops to
hostilities abroad rests in article I, section 8 of the Constitution which
authorizes Congress to provide for the common defense, to declare
war, to raise and support—for up to 2 years at a time—the Army and
Navy, to make rules to regulate and govern the military forces . . .”183

These references to “troops” is a clear indication that the focus of the WPR
was actual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines—not their equipment, military
materiel, or other property. “Armed forces” was meant to mean people from
the very beginning.184
Recent operations have confirmed the continuing reliance by the Executive
on “boots on the ground” as the trigger for WPR constraints. In response to a
question directly about the application of the WPR to the 2011 military
operations in Libya, President Obama stated,
I spoke to the American people about what we would do. I said there
would be no troops on the ground . . . We have done exactly what I
said we would do. We have not put any boots on the ground . . . But
do I think that our actions in any way violate the War Powers
Resolution? The answer is ‘no.’ So I don’t even have to get to the
constitutional question.”185

In response to President Obama’s reading of the WPR, Minority Leader of the
House of Representative, Nancy Pelosi agreed. “The limited nature of this
183

Id. at S14216 (statement of Sen. Huddleston).
Two potential arguments against this interpretation are the following: First, Congress indicated in other
documents, such as a 1966 treaty with the Republic of Korea, that it could distinguish between “United States
Armed Forces” and “members of the United States Armed Forces.” Facilities and Areas and the Status of
United States Armed Forces in Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., July 9, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1677 (defining “members of the
United States armed forces” as an independent phrase than United States armed forces itself for purposes of
the treaty). Indeed, the WPR itself includes the assignment of “members of such armed forces” to command
and accompany the military forces of other countries within the Act’s definition of the phrase “introduction of
United States Armed Forces.” War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1547(c) (2012). Thus, if Congress wanted
the President to be restricted by the WPR only when actual members of the United States Armed Forces were
introduced into another country, it could, and should, have said so. Second, Congress’ intent in enacting the
WPR was not merely to prevent the President from unilaterally placing members of the United States Armed
Forces into harm’s way. This is evident from the fact that the WPR does not require written reports from the
President for some deployments that are not aimed at starting hostilities. See id. §1543(a)(2). Consequently,
the full text of the WPR appears to be aimed at forbidding the President from circumventing Congress’
constitutional right to declare war. This aim would certainly be consistent with a broader interpretation of the
phrase “introduction of United States Armed Forces” than one that requires boots on the ground. Despite these
potential arguments, the weight of evidence seems to clearly indicate that Congress was intending to protect
actual military personnel when it passed the WPR.
185 CNS News, Obama Won’t Answer If War Powers Resolution Is Constitutional, YOUTUBE (June 29,
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXwDkPu0IpU.
184
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engagement allows the president to go forward. I’m satisfied that the president
has the authority he needs to go ahead. If we had boots on the ground . . . then
that’s a different story.”186
Even more recently, in response to the deployment of 130 troops to Iraq in
the face of advancing ISIS forces, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel “stressed
that the latest deployment ‘is not a combat-boots-on-the-ground operation.’”187
This continuing reliance on whether there are “boots on the ground” when
classifying a conflict for domestic law purposes reinforces the original
understanding of the WPR as this being a trigger for the application of the
statute. As will be discussed in Part III, the future technologies discussed
above will allow the President to engage in significant uses of military power
with almost no chance of triggering the statute.
b. Hostilities
The first potential way of meeting the second trigger for the WPR is
“hostilities.” By introducing armed forces into hostilities, the full WPR is
effectuated. However, what defines hostilities is not clear,188 especially in light
of new technologies.
In the 1973 debates over the WPR, the principal sponsor, Senator Jacob K.
Javits, was asked at a House of Representatives hearing whether the term
‘hostilities’ was problematic because of “the susceptibility of it to different
interpretations,” making this “a very fuzzy area.”189 Senator Javits
acknowledged the vagueness of the term but suggested that it was a necessary
feature of the legislation: “There is no question about that, but that decision
would be for the President to make. No one is trying to denude the President of
authority.”190
This approach of looking to the Executive Branch for a definition of
“hostilities” has continued since the WPR’s passage, causing one scholar to
186 Mike Lillis, Pelosi backs Obama on Libya, THE HILL, June 16, 2011, available at
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/166843-pelosi-backs-obama-on-libya.
187 Patrick Goodenough, “Not a Combat-Boots-on-the-Ground Operation,” Says Hagel, Announcing 130
More Troops to Iraq, CNSNEWS, (Aug. 12, 2014, 10:16 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrickgoodenough/not-combat-boots-ground-operation-says-hagel-announcing-130-more.
188 James Nathan, Salvaging the War Powers Resolution, 23 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 235, 244–46 (1993);
James Nathan, Revising the War Powers Act, 17 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 513, 522–23 (1991).
189 War Powers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments
of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong. 22 (1973) (statement of Peirre S. du Pont IX).
190 Id.
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argue that “[f]rom the beginning, it appears that Congress has largely left the
determination of ‘hostilities’ to executive practice.”191 As evidence of this
practice, two years after the passage of the WPR, Congress sought clarification
from the Executive Branch as to the meaning of the term “hostilities.”192
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and Martin
Hoffman, Defense Department General Counsel, answered that the Executive
Branch understood the term “to mean a situation in which units of the U.S.
Armed Forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of
hostile forces.”193
The House Report of the WPR stated that “[t]he word hostilities was
substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the subcommittee drafting
process because it was considered to be somewhat broader in scope,” but the
Executive Branch argues that neither the legislation nor its drafting history
provides any more clarity to its meaning.194 In recent hearings before
Congress, Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh acknowledged that
“hostilities” is an inherently ambiguous legal standard and stated that in his
opinion:
[T]he legislative history of the resolution makes clear there was no
fixed view on exactly what the term “hostilities” would encompass.
Members of Congress understood that the term was vague, but
specifically declined to give it more concrete meaning, in part to
avoid unduly hampering future Presidents by making the resolution a
“one size fits all” straitjacket that would operate mechanically,
without regard to particular circumstances.195

As further explained by Mr. Koh, recent Administrations have established
four factors that help determine on a case-by-case basis whether “hostilities”

191 Allison Arnold, Cyber Hostilities and the War Powers Resolution, 217 MIL. L. REV. 174, 184 (2013).
Congress has passed legislation since the WPR that defines “hostilities.” Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C.
§ 948(a)(9) (2006) & Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(9) (2009) defines “hostilities” as “any
conflict subject to the laws of war.” However, this definition appears in the Military Commissions Act and is
designed to establish jurisdiction for the purposes of individual criminal liability and does not seem in any
sense to be applicable to the application of the WPR. However, as will be discussed in Part IV, such a
definition would be useful in adding strength to the WPR as a Congressional restraint on the President.
192 Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 13–14 (2011)
[hereinafter Libya Hearing] (prepared statement of Hon. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC).
193 Id.; see also Arnold, supra note 191, at 184.
194 H.R. Rep. No. 93-287, at 2351 (1973).
195 Id.
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exist.196 These four factors are “whether the mission is limited, whether the
risk of escalation is limited, whether the exposure is limited, and whether the
choice of military means is narrowly constrained.”197 It was an analysis of
these four factors that allowed President Obama to determine the WPR was not
implicated in the 2011 coalition military operations against Libya because the
action involved only “intermittent military engagements” which would not
require the withdrawal of forces under the WPR.198 Mr. Koh added that the
U.S. military actions in Libya were “well within the scope of the kinds of
activity that in the past have not been deemed to be hostilities for purposes of
the War Powers Resolution.”199
Not all members of Congress agreed with President Obama’s interpretation
of the term. Congressman John Boehner argued that the actions in Libya were
clearly hostilities.
You know, the White House says there are no hostilities taking
place,” said U.S. House Speaker John Boehner, a Republican. “Yet
we’ve got drone attacks underway. They’re spending $10 million a
day, part of an effort to drop bombs on Gadhafi’s compounds. It just
doesn’t pass the straight-face test in my view, that we’re not in the
midst of hostilities.200

Others took a similar view. Representative Brad Sherman argued that the
WPR was “the law of the land” and that “if the president deploys forces, he’s
got to seek Congressional authorization or begin pulling out after 60 days. Too
many presidents have simply ignored the law . . . [w]hen you’re flying Air
Force bombers over enemy territory, you are engaged in combat.”201
In addition to members of Congress, some of the most notable War Powers
academics also thought the military operations in Libya may qualify under the
statute. Professor Robert Chesney argued that when compared with other

196

Id. at 21.
Id.
198 Id. at 14, 16.
199 Id. at 21. See also MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
1-3 (2013); Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A16 (adding that the “limited nature of this particular mission [in Libya] is not
the kind of ‘hostilities’ envisioned by the War Powers Resolution”).
200 Angie Drobnic Holan & Louis Jacobson, Are U.S. Actions in Libya Subject to the War Powers
Resoultion? A Review of the Evidence, POLITIFACT.COM (June 22, 2011, 11:38 AM), http://www.politifact.
com/truth-o-meter/article/2011/jun/22/are-us-actions-libya-subject-war-powers-resolution/.
201 Id.
197
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historical actions and Executive and Legislative responses, the operations in
Libya could be considered hostilities.202
Despite objections, the President pressed ahead with military operations
and, as noted above, continues to do so in more current operations such as in
Iraq.203 In fact, as one scholar has recently written, “Truman, Ford, Kennedy,
Johnson, Nixon, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton and Obama all claimed
the power to initiate hostilities without congressional authorization.”204
President Obama’s decision to follow the four factors as defining criteria for
the WPR allowed considerable freedom of activity. A similar decision by
future presidents will have significant impacts on the future application of the
WPR to conflicts involving emerging technologies.
3. Geographic Space
The other possibility from the second part of the WPR trigger is the
introduction of armed forces “equipped for combat” into the “territory,
airspace or waters of a foreign nation.”205
The House of Representatives Report on the WPR provides some insight
into Congress’ intent in using this language. According to the Report, Congress
intended the WPR to apply to
the initial commitment of troops in situations in which there is no
actual fighting but some risk, however small, of the forces being
involved in hostilities. A report would be required any time combat
military forces were sent to another nation to alter or preserve the
existing political status quo or to make the U.S. presence felt. Thus,
for example, the dispatch of Marines to Thailand in 1962 and the
quarantine of Cuba in the same year would have required Presidential
reports. Reports would not be required for routine port supply calls,
emergency aid measures, normal training exercises, and other
noncombat military activities.206

202 Robert Chesney, White House Clarifies Position on Libya and the WPR: US Forces Not Engaged in
“Hostilities”, LAWFARE (June 15, 2011, 3:46 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/white-houseclarifies-position-on-libya-and-the-wpr-us-forces-not-engaged-in-hostilities/.
203 See Kristina Wong, Iraq Clock Ticks for Obama, THE HILL (Aug. 19, 2014, 6:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/215451-obama-tiptoeing-around-war-powers-limits.
204 MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 7 (2013).
205 H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 2352 (1973).
206 Id.
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This particular aspect of the WPR trigger has not seemed to be decisive in
WPR discussions. There have certainly been situations where this language
would have seemed to apply—such as Kosovo and Libya—but it has not been
dispositive in bringing the Executive Branch to accept the applicability of the
WPR and comply with the notification procedures. This language will be even
less consequential with respect to future military operations involving
advanced technologies because of its its tie to the definition of armed forces, as
will be discussed below.
4. Substantial Enlargement
The House Report again sheds some light on what Congress intended with
this WPR trigger. According to the Report, the word “substantially” was meant
to be a “flexible criterion.”207 The Report provides some examples of when this
trigger would be met:
A 100-percent increase in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy—
say from 5 to 10—clearly would not be an occasion for a report. A
thousand additional men sent to Europe under present circumstances
does not significantly enlarge the total U.S. troop strength of about
300,000 already there. However, the dispatch of 1,000 men to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000
would mean an increase of 25 percent, which is substantial. Under
this circumstance, President Kennedy would have been required to
report to Congress in 1962 when he raised the number of U.S.
military advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.208

As with the language concerning geographic borders, this language has also
not been argued in past military operations and is unlikely to have much effect
in future operations, again because of its tie to the definition of “armed forces.”
A substantial enlargement would require an initial use of armed forces.
III. INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE WPR
Recall the earlier discussion of Congress’s purpose in passing the WPR.209
At the time, Congress felt disenfranchised in their constitutional role in warmaking.210 In the wake of the Vietnam War, Congress felt that successive
207

Id.
Id.
209 See supra Part II.A.
210 See Judah A. Druck, Droning On: The War Powers Resolution and the Numbing Effect of TechnologyDriven Warfare, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 209, 213 (2012).
208
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Presidents from both political parties had ignored the Constitutional design of
shared national security powers with respect to using military force.211
Congress passed the WPR to force the President to acknowledge that Congress
also had a role in the use of the military and to add some definition to what that
role was, with an emphasis on consultation.212 Given the likely
unconstitutionality of Section Five after Raines v. Byrd and subsequent Court
decisions, the fourth section’s requirements on reporting become the primary
methodology for Congress to ensure consultation.
Considering the discussion in the previous Part that highlighted issues with
the WPR, this Part will now analyze the future weapon systems discussed in
Part I in light of the issues with the WPR to conclude that the WPR will be
ineffective in controlling the use of these advanced technologies by the
President as currently understood and applied.
A. Armed Forces
As discussed above, the term “armed forces” has generally been understood
to mean members of the United States military.213 The often-used phrase of
“boots on the ground” would be even more restrictive and not include many
operations, such as typical Navy and Air Force operations where no U.S.
personnel are utilized in a way that they might come into physical contact with
an opposing force. As mentioned above, Senator Boehner didn’t seem to take
the view that the Air Force and Navy were excluded.214 Under either
interpretation, the use of advanced technologies calls into question the
effectiveness of the WPR in accomplishing Congress’s goal of forcing the
President to consult before engaging in activities that might lead to hostilities.
Several examples will adequately illustrate this point.
1. Drones
The use of drones obviously raises issues with respect to the composition
of “armed forces” within the WPR. Any remotely piloted drone would by
definition be a situation where the operator was not on the ground where the
weapon’s effects were to occur. In the military operations against terrorists, the
211 See Edwin B. Firmage, The War Power of Congress and Revision of the War Powers Resolution, 17 J.
CONTEMP. L. 237, 237 (1991).
212 See Druck, supra note 210, at 213–14.
213 See supra Part II.C.2.a.
214 See supra Part II.C.2.b.
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President has claimed authority to use drones based on Congressional action in
passing the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF)215 but it is unclear
whether the President believes he must have authority to use drones in other
situations, even armed drones. There does not appear to be any statement by
the Executive Branch that the use of armed drones involves the introduction of
armed forces under the WPR. Prior reports that the President has filed
“consistent with” the WPR reporting requirements have not included reports
on drone usage.
Additionally, the President’s determination that the limited use of Air Force
personnel during the military operations in Libya did not trigger his reporting
requirements under the WPR216 make it seem clear that the use of armed
drones would certainly not do so either. In Libya, aircrews were actually
entering Libyan airspace.217 The use of armed drones would not only not
involve “boots on the ground” but would not even involve “boots in the air.”
As long as the introduction of armed forces is equated to “boots on the
ground,” the use of armed drones will not meet that trigger.
Alternatively, one could argue that the WPR language is sufficient to
include the employment of drones. Drones certainly can mimic troops in many
ways. They can enter into foreign nations; they can be flown to those nations in
large numbers; and they can add to the number of drones that are already in
that nation and that are equipped for combat. Indeed, the use of the word
“repair”218 in the WPR could be understood to imply that the phrase “United
States Armed Forces” encompasses materials used by the Armed Forces and
not just human members of the Armed Forces. However, the practice of past
and current Presidents has been to treat drones as if they were not “armed
forces” for WPR reporting purposes.
As technology increases and drones become smaller (eventually
microscopic when combined with advances in nanotechnology), and more
lethal, with longer loiter capabilities, and are created in great masses, they will
present a very capable weapons and reconnaissance platform. Such a capability
will be a very effective asset to use in military operations and will undoubtedly
be so.
215 See Milena Sterio, The United States’ Use of Drones in the War on Terror: The (Il)legality of Targeted
Killings Under International Law, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 197, 198 (2012).
216 Savage & Landler, supra note 199.
217 Libya Hearing, supra note 192, at 24.
218 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(2) (2006).
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For example, assume that an insurgent group rises in a country that is an
ally to the United States and threatens to overthrow the government and
establish a government that is not friendly to the U.S. The allied government
seeks military assistance from the President, who determines that sending a
fleet of 100 unmanned armed drones to quickly and decisively engage the
insurgent group would be an effective military option. Pilots located in Nevada
would fly the drones, and an airport in a neighboring country would launch and
maintain them. No U.S. persons would actually be deployed to the allied
country where the insurgency is occurring. Under the current pattern of
analysis, such action will not trigger the WPR, despite the significant
destructive effect the drones would cause.
2. Cyber Operations
Further, consider the use of cyber technologies. These advanced weapons
can be initiated far from any battlefield and in a place remote from the
intended victim of the action. As already discussed, one of their greatest
appeals is their effectiveness without putting those using them in harm’s
way.219 Because of this, the nature of cyber operations have caused at least one
cyber scholar to speculate that there should be a “duty to hack” because of the
bloodless nature, both to the attacker and the victim, of cyber operations.220
The example of the recent STUXNET malware is instructive. STUXNET
appears to have been a well planned and highly effective cyber operation
which resulted in the physical destruction of almost 1,000 centrifuges used in
the nuclear enrichment process.221 It is alleged to have been the work of the
U.S. and Israel.222 However, no member of the military ever stepped foot in
Iran or even flew over Iran in connection with the operation so far as the world
knows.223 In other words, the U.S., assuming the U.S. was involved, was able

219

See also Blake & Imburgia, supra note 25, at 183.
See Duncan B. Hollis, Re-Thinking the Boundaries of Law in Cyberspace: A Duty to Hack?, in
CYBERWARE: LAW & ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS (J. Ohlin et al. eds., forthcoming Mar. 2015).
221 See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-againstiran.
222 William J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Sanger, Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran
Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2011), at A1.
223 See Robert Lee, The History of Stuxnet: Key Takeaways for Cyber Decision Makers, AFCEA
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.afcea.org/committees/cyber/ (follow “Robert Lee-The History of Stuxnet”
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
220
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to accomplish a priority national security goal that would have required
significant military assets if done through some other, more kinetic, means.
Presumably, if the President had decided to use kinetic operations, surely
the specter of the WPR would have been raised. If an attack by Air Force
assets or a mission for some special operations unit, similar to the one that
killed Osama Bin Laden,224 had been used similar effects may have occurred.
But, because the entire operation was done through cyber means, it appears
that neither the President, nor Congress felt that the WPR was implicated.
There were no “boots on the ground,” and the operative United States assets
were presumably far from the territory of Iran and likely operating within the
territory of the United States or one of its allies.
This apparent perception that the President can conduct a significant
military action that would otherwise involve the WPR but does not, because it
was accomplished through the use of cyber means, should serve as a warning
to Congress. If the President feels comfortable executing STUXNET without
consultation, it would be hard to envision a category of cyber actions that
would cause the President to think he should notify Congress.
As Arnold points out, Congress has engaged to some degree on the issue of
cyber activities by passing the National Defense Authorization Act.225 The
2012 National Defense Authorization Act contained a provision that authorized
cyber activities, subject to the War Powers Resolution.226 Of course, being
“subject to” the WPR does not mean it applies. It simply means that when it
applies, the Executive Branch will comply with its requirements.227 In its
Cyberspace Policy Report, the DoD responded to the question by the Senate:
“[w]hat constitutes use of force in cyberspace for the purpose of complying

224 Peter Bergen, Who Really Killed bin Laden?, CNN (Mar. 27, 2013, 6:46 PM),
www.cnn.com/2013/03/26/world/bergen-who-killed-bin-laden/.
225 Arnold, supra note 191, at 176.
226 National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011)
which states:

Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and upon direction by the
President may conduct offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and
interests, subject to—
(1) the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities,
including the law of armed conflict; and
(2) the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541).
227

See Arnold, supra note 191, at 177.
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with the War Powers Act.”228 The answer demonstrates the elusive nature of
categorization of these future weapons.
The requirements of the War Powers Resolution apply to “the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such
forces in hostilities or in such situations.”
Cyber operations might not include the introduction of armed forces
personnel into the area of hostilities. Cyber operations may, however,
be a component of larger operations that could trigger notification
and reporting in accordance with the War Powers Resolution. The
Department will continue to assess each of its actions in cyberspace
to determine when the requirements of the War Powers Resolution
may apply to those actions.229

The DoD’s assessment of each of its cyber actions will no doubt occur given
the Executive Branch’s understanding of the WPR discussed above. Such an
assessment is unlikely to prove much of a constraint on presidential actions, as
the threshold for triggering the WPR is so high.
3. Other Emerging Technologies
Other advanced weapon systems, such as those involving nanotechnology
and genomics, are similar to those discussed above. In each of these cases,
there will certainly be human involvement in the design, creation, and
utilization of these weapons, but all of this will take place far from any
battlefield and from the area where the effects of the weapon are designed to
take place. There will be no “boots on the ground.”
Even in the case of robots and autonomous weapons, it is unclear how the
“boots on the ground” standard will apply. To the extent that “boots on the
ground” refers to putting American lives at risk, the President would have a
clear argument that these should be treated similar to drones, and not be
considered as crossing that threshold.

228 U.S DEP’T OF DEF. CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 9 (2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411_cyberstrategy/docs/NDAA%20Section%20934%20Report_
For%20webpage.pdf.
229 Id.
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For example, assume the same scenario above where an ally is seeking help
from the U.S. against an insurgency. As part of the response, the President
wants to install autonomous sentry systems to guard several key government
sites from potential attack. Though the use of these systems may lead to
significant casualties, there would be no U.S. persons in the allied country—no
“boots on the ground.” The Executive Branch is unlikely to deem such action
as triggering the reporting and consultation requirements of the WPR.
****
Generally then, the current understanding of “armed forces” will not
provide limits on the presidential use of power under the WPR with respect to
many emerging technologies. Looking to “boots on the ground” as the
clarifying paradigm of what the introduction of armed forces means under the
statute will not provide Congress with the notification and consultation it
desires. In order to continue the validity of the WPR as a notification tool for
Presidential actions in future military operations, Congress will need to
elucidate a different understanding of the term “armed forces.”
B. Hostilities
The Executive Branch’s measure for “hostilities” also favors action by the
President without implicating the WPR with respect to future technologies. As
stated by Harold Koh, the four determining factors are “whether the mission is
limited, whether the risk of escalation is limited, whether the exposure is
limited, and whether the choice of military means is narrowly constrained.”230
Importantly, it appears that the determination of how each military operation
fits into these four factors is an Executive Branch determination, not one for
Congress.231 It is unlikely that future military operations using the advanced
technologies discussed above will be considered “hostilities,” as defined by
these four factors, in a way that will meaningfully constrain the President with
respect to the WPR.
1. Drone Operations
When considered in light of the four hostilities factors, drones become an
even more attractive tool for the President when deciding to use lethal military
230

Libya Hearing, supra note 192, at 21.
Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 21 (2011)
(statement of Harold Koh).
231
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force. In the current attack on terrorist targets, every target is considered a
unique operation and gets individual approval.232 It is hard to imagine a more
limited mission. Because the current missions in places like Yemen are done
with host nation approval,233 the risk of escalation is minimal, as more than a
decade of drone operations has proven. With no “boots on the ground,”
exposure of U.S. personnel is obviously limited and drones present a very
tailored choice of means of action. In other words, it appears that judging
hostilities by the Executive Branch’s four criteria seems tailor-made for a
President who favors drone operations.234
Indeed, current practice confirms this approach. The President’s on-going
use of armed drones against terrorists has never been understood as
“hostilities” by the Executive Branch.235 Congress is often notified in advance
or shortly after a drone strike, but the President has never conceded that this
information was shared in compliance with the WPR. Again, Executive
practice is creating a “gloss”236 that will be relied on by future Executives.
2. Cyber Operations
Allison Arnold has recently published an excellent analysis of whether
“cyber hostilities” would trigger the WPR, concluding that “it is unlikely that
the executive branch would deem stand-alone offensive military operations
in cyberspace as ‘hostilities’ triggering the War Powers Resolution.”237
Arnold’s conclusions are exactly right.
Similar to drones, a number of significant and serious cyber operations
would fall below the threshold of hostilities as described by the four factors.
232 See Michael Crowley, Holder: Obama’s New Drone-Strike ‘Playbook’ Has Arrived, TIME, May 22,
2013, at 1.
233 Greg Miller, Yemeni President Acknowledges Approving U.S. Drone Strikes, WASH. POST (Sept. 29,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/yemeni-president-acknowledges-approvingus-drone-strikes/2012/09/29/09bec2ae-0a56-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_story.html.
234 Charlie Savage and Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011 at 2 (“The administration’s theory implies that the president can wage a war with
drones and all manner of offshore missiles without having to bother with the War Powers Resolution’s time
limits.” (quoting Jack Goldsmith)).
235 See id. at 2.
236 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated
as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”); Corn, supra note 11, at 690 n.13.
237 Arnold, supra note 191, at 192.
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Perhaps the most contested factor would be the risk of escalation. Many cyber
experts have written about the potential for escalation in cyber operations.238
However, the anonymous nature of the Internet and the difficulties of
attribution239 dramatically temper the risk of escalation.
Once again, the example of the recent STUXNET malware is instructive.
Assuming that the United States was involved,240 the President initiated an act
which most experts and commentators in the area believe violated the
international law prohibition on the use of force and may even have been an
armed attack.241 As mentioned above, a similar attack on such a scale using
kinetic means would seem to trigger the WPR. However, Arnold analyzes
STUXNET using the four factors and determines that a military operation even
of that scale, done solely by cyber means, would not trigger the WPR.242
Assuming the U.S. was involved in STUXNET, the President seems to agree
with Arnold’s analysis since neither President Bush nor President Obama
notified Congress of the “cyber hostilities.”243
As a practical matter, with respect to the factor of escalation, the anonymity
of a cyber attack weighs in favor of such attacks not being hostilities. It was
almost two years before computer analysts could attribute the attack to Israel
238 Eugene Kapersky, Space Escalation of Cyber-Warfare is a Call for Action, available at
http://www.kapersky.com (Oct. 16, 2012); MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CRISIS AND ESCALATION IN CYBERSPACE (Rand
Corporation 2012) available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1215.html; Vincent Manzo,
Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations: Where Do Space and Cyberspace fit? INSTITUTE FOR
NATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (Dec. 2011), available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/111201_
manzo_sf272.pdf:///U:/Publications/Current/WPR/Sources/Manzo%20-%20INSS.pdf.
239 Michael Schmitt, ‘Below the Threshold’ Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option
and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming); Jack Beard, Legal Phantoms in Cyberspace: The
Problematic Status of Information as a Weapon and a Target Under International Humanitarian Law, 47
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 67 (2014); Susan Brenner, Cyber-threats and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control, 14
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 137 (2013); Bradley Raboin, Corresponding Evolution: International Law and the
Emergence of Cyber Warfare, J. NAT’L ASS’N L. JUD. 602 (2011); Erik Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department
of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace and the Attribution Problem, 68 A.F. L. REV. 167 (2012);
MARTIN C. LIBICKI, CYBERDETTERENCE AND CYBERWARFARE, 76–78 (Rand Corporation 2009); Duncan B.
Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 397–401 (2011); Jonathan Soloman,
Cyberdeterrence between Nation-States Plausible Strategy or a Pipe Dream?, 5 STRATEGIC STUDIES Q. 1, 5–
10 (2011); Commander Todd C. Huntley, Controlling the Use of Force in Cyber Space: The Application of the
Law of Armed Conflict During A Time of Fundamental Change in the Nature of Warfare, 60 NAVAL L. REV. 1,
34–35 (2010).
240 Iran Blames U.S., Israel for Stuxnet Malware, CBS NEWS (Apr. 16, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/iran-blames-us-israel-for-stuxnet-malware/.
241 See generally THE TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, at 42–45 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
242 See Arnold, supra note 191, at 191.
243 See Ashley Deeks, The Geography of Cyber Conflict: Through a Glass Darkly, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 1,
17 (2013).
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and/or the U.S. and then without certainty.244 Though Iran called for
retribution,245 the passage of time had severely limited Iran’s legal options.
3. Other Emerging Technologies
The President’s application of the four factors for determination of the
existence of hostilities is equally unlikely to apply to many potential uses of
advanced technologies. For example, the use of robots or autonomous weapons
provides little risk to U.S. persons. An anonymous infiltration of nanobots into
another nation’s steel manufacturing industry to create flawed material is
unlikely to result in an escalation of conflict. Establishing a series of
autonomous sentry sites as discussed above is a very narrow and limited
response to a call for help from an ally and unlikely to result in risk to the
United States. These and other potential uses of emerging technologies will not
meet the common understanding of hostilities yet are almost certainly the kinds
of Executive actions about which Congress is hoping to be notified.
****
Emerging technologies, including those discussed above, will open a wide
array of new military options to the President. And the uses of these
technologies are under regulated by the current WPR. Because the President’s
obligation to notify Congress under the WPR is tied to the onset of hostilities,
and the employment of these future technologies will not equate to hostilities
in most instances, the use of drones, cyber and other emerging technologies
will not trigger the Executive’s obligation to provide notice to Congress. If this
does not meet the intent of Congress in the desire for notification and
consultation, it must do something to pull these types of Executive action
under the current WPR.
IV. AMENDING THE WPR
Given the clear inadequacies of the WPR, the recognition of the need for
revision has been widespread, beginning with the statute’s original sponsors.246
244 Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, Stuxnet was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials Say, WASH.
POST (June 2, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-andisraeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html#.
245 Nicole Perlroth & Quentin Hardy, Bank Hacking Was the Work of Iranians, Official Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/technology/online-banking-attacks-were-work-of-iran-usofficials-say.html?_r=0.
246 BAKER ET AL., supra note 8, at 21.
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Time has only deepened that conviction. The sections below look at previously
proposed solutions and then advance a new solution to the WPR that will allow
it to cover the use of advanced technologies discussed in this article.
A. Previously Proposed Solutions
There have been several suggestions of ways to amend the WPR to make it
more effective in current operations. Various legislative proposals,
Commission Reports and scholarly articles have all recognized the problems
with the existing WPR and proposed solutions to problems. These potential
solutions will be discussed below. However, despite the merit of many of these
proposals, none of them would effectively accomplish Congress’s intent of
ensuring notification and consultation with respect to the use of emerging
technologies in future armed conflicts.
1. Legislative Proposals247
Since the passage of the WPR, there has been a consistent call to repeal the
legislation248 and “rely on traditional political pressures and the regular system
of checks and balances, including impeachment”249 to control Executive
actions. On June 7, 1995, the House of Representatives actually voted on a bill
to repeal the WPR which failed by a vote of 217 to 201.250 The bill looked like
it would pass until forty-four Republicans switched sides and voted against the
measure in order to not strengthen the then-democratic President, Bill
Clinton.251
There have also been a number of legislative attempts to amend the WPR,
in light of its acknowledged shortcomings. One of the most significant was a

at http://millercenter.org/policy/commissions/warpowers/report.
247 See GRIMMETT, supra note 20, at 44–48 (outlining and discussing proposed amendments to the WPR
since its inception).
248 For example, in 1988, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on War Powers held extensive
hearings after President Reagan’s decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf. During those
hearings, many national security experts and former government employees urged the subcommittee to seek
repeal of the WPR. See The War Power After 200 Years: Congress and the President at a Constitutional
Impasse, Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on War Powers of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 100th Congress (1989); Biden & Ritch, supra note 103, at 370.
249 Fisher & Adler, supra note 12, at 1 (arguing that “outright repeal would be less risky than continuing
along the present path.”).
250 See GRIMMETT, supra note 20, at 2; Fisher & Adler, supra note 249, at 15.
251 Fisher & Adler, supra note 12, at 16.
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Use of Force Act proposed by Senator Biden in a 1989 law review article.252
The proposed Act listed a number of circumstances where the President could
use force without further authorization from Congress.253 The proposal would
then define the “use of force” as “the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”254 The Act would have also
established a consultative group, mandating meetings between certain
Members of Congress and various Executive Branch officials, including the
President, where discussion would occur but consent would not be required.255
Another attempt at amendment was the War Powers Resolution
Amendment of 1988,256 known as the Byrd-Warner amendments, but also
supported by Senators Nunn and Mitchell. In explaining his reasoning behind
the Bill, Senator Byrd stated that the intent of the amendments was to
“change[] the presumption of the current War Powers Resolution, which is that
U.S Armed Forces must withdraw from situations of hostilities or imminent
hostilities within 60 days unless Congress specifically authorizes their
continued presence.”257 No Congressional action was taken on this proposal.258
None of these legislative proposals have passed, nor would they have
effectively dealt with emerging technologies. Further, there are no legislative
proposals that would have solved the “armed forces” or “hostilities” problem
in a way that would have covered future developments in armed conflict.259

252

See Biden & Ritch, supra note 103, at 367.
Id. at 398–99. Senator Biden, wary of those who would respond by saying this was too excessive a
grant of authority to the President, responded by writing that “while generous in scope, this affirmation of
authorities would also define and limit what the President can do and what justifications he can properly use.”
Id.
254 Id.at 401.
255 Id. at 402–03.
256 “War Powers Resolution Amendments of 1988,” S.J. Res. 323, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1988).
Representative Lee Hamilton introduced a companion bill in the House of Representatives, H.R. J. Res. 601,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
257 134 CONG. REC. S6174 (daily ed. May 19, 1988); see Biden & Ritch, supra note 103, at 393.
258 See GRIMMETT, supra note 20, at 24.
259 See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(9) (2006); Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C.
§948a(9) (2009) (though this definition would provide some interesting legal interpretations if applied to the
WPR, it was clearly passed specifically to grant jurisdiction for military commissions who are trying members
of terrorist groups covered by that statute and was never intended to apply to the WPR).
253
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2. War Powers Consultation Act of 2009
Recognizing the ineffective history of the WPR, the University of
Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs260 invited a number of former
government experts on national security, including two former Secretaries of
State who served as co-chairs, to “identify a practical solution to help future
Executive and Legislative Branch leaders deal with the issue [of war
powers].”261 The National War Powers Commission Report that was produced
by the invitees proposed legislation which the Report calls the War Powers
Consultation Act of 2009 (WPCA) and urges Congress to pass the Act and the
President to sign it.262 The Act tries to meet the most important needs of both
the President and the Congress.263
The proposed WPCA does a number of things meant to correct existing
flaws in the WPR. The WPCA would create a “Joint Congressional
Consultation Committee” consisting of some of the key members of
Congress264 with whom the President would be “encouraged to consult
regularly with.”265 It requires the President to consult the Committee only with
respect to “deployment of United States armed forces into significant armed
conflict”266 which is defined as “(i) any conflict expressly authorized by
Congress or (ii) any combat operation by U.S. armed forces lasting more than a
260 THE MILLER CENTER, http://millercenter.org (a nonpartisan institute that seeks to expand
understanding of the presidency, policy, and political history, providing critical insights for the nation’s
governance challenges).
261 BAKER ET AL., supra note 8.
262 Id. at 10.
263 Id. at 9. The Report states:

We recognize the Act we propose may not be one that satisfies all Presidents or all Congresses in
every circumstance. On the President’s side of the ledger, however, the statute generally should
be attractive because it involves Congress only in “significant armed conflict,” no minor
engagements. Moreover, it reverses the presumption that inaction by Congress means that
Congress has disapproved of a military campaign and that the President is acting lawlessly if he
proceeds with the conflict. On the congressional side of the ledger, the Act gives the Legislative
Branch more by way of meaningful consultation and information. It also provides Congress a
clear and simple mechanism by which to approve or disapprove a military campaign, and does so
in a way that seeks to avoid the constitutional infirmities that plague the War Powers Resolution
of 1973. Altogether, the Act works to gives [sic] Congress a sear at the table; it gives the
President the benefit of Congress’s counsel; and it provides a mechanism for the President and
the public to know Congress’s views before or as a military campaign begins.
Id.

264
265
266

Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
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week or expected by the President to last more than a week.”267 The proposed
WPCS also reverses the highly contested portion of the WPR which requires
the President to remove troops based on Congressional inaction and instead
requires Congress to take action by formally approving or disapproving of the
President’s decision to deploy troops.268
Despite the quality of the participants in the Commission and the vast
experience in Government service upon which they relied, Congress has not
chosen to adopt the Report’s recommendations and pass the WPCA. However,
Senators McCain and Kaine introduced the WPCA as a bill on the Senate floor
on January 16, 2014.269 At the time of writing, it seems very unlikely that the
Bill will pass, but this is at least a signal of the quality of the WPCA
recommendations.
However, though scholars have also found that the WPCA would represent
many improvements to the WPR, it would not avoid the most contentious of
WPR issues, the triggering mechanism. As Prof. Corn writes, using the term
“significant armed conflict” as the trigger does not solve the problem because
it “creates the same inherent risk for one critical reason: it is not tethered to a
military operational criterion.”270
Similarly, the proposed WPCA would also be as ineffective as the WPR in
regulating future armed conflicts. Its continuing reliance on the term “armed
forces” leaves one of the major issues with respect to future technologies
unsolved. Further, removing the term “hostilities” and substituting for it the
term “significant armed conflict” is equally unhelpful. Not only does the
definition of “significant armed conflict” includes the term “armed forces,” but
“like the failed concept of ‘hostilities[] or . . . situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,’ the
concept of ‘armed conflict’ will almost inevitably be susceptible to interpretive
debate.”271

267

Id. at 10.
Id. at 47–48.
269 See Floor Remarks by Senator John McCain Introducing War Powers Consultation Act (Jan. 16,
2014),
http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/1/floor-remarks-by-senator-john-mccainintroducing-war-powers-consultation-act (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
270 Corn, supra note 11, at 713–14 (2010).
271 Id. at 693–94.
268
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Though the WPCA may have made an improvement on the current debates
concerning the WPR, it would not provide a solution to future armed
conflicts.272
3. Rules of Engagement (ROE)
Perhaps the most useful of these proposals is the recommendation by
Professor Corn to tie the WPR273 requirement to notify Congress to the
Executive Branch’s determination that mission-specific supplemental measures
to the Standing Rules of Engagement274 are needed. Corn recognizes the
importance of the “trigger” in making the WPR more effective275 and argues
that “[l]inking such notification to the authorization of ‘mission specific’ Rules
of Engagement . . . will substantially contribute to the efficacy of the
historically validated war-making balance between the President and
Congress.”276
As Corn explains, when the President takes actions with military forces,
other than traditional defense of the United States,277 he normally authorizes
the use of force to accomplish specific missions.278 In other words, when the
President sends military personnel to attack an enemy, he provides them with
ROE that authorize them to use force outside of self-defense to accomplish a
mission.279 Such measures may include declaring certain individuals or
members of organized groups as “declared hostile forces” who can be attacked
on sight.280
272

Chen, supra note 38, at 1801.
Corn, supra note 11, at 695. Professor Corn actually makes his recommendations in light of the WPCA
discussed above. However, his recommendations would be just as effective if amended to the WPR and since
the WPCA does not seem likely to be passed by Congress, this article will treat Corn’s recommendations as if
they were made concerning the WPR.
274 The Standing Rules of Engagement is a document promulgated and maintained by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff that “establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by
US commanders and their forces during all military operations and contingencies and routine Military
Department functions.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES A-1 (June 13, 2005).
275 Corn, supra note 11, at 694–95.
276 Id. at 695.
277 Id. at 715.
278 Id. at 719–23.
279 For a broad discussion on ROE, see Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian
Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMP. L. REV.
787, 803–24 (2008).
280 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR
U.S. FORCES A-2 to A-3 (June 13, 2005).
273
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Corn then postulates that the invocation of mission-specific ROE provide a
“more effective consultation trigger”281 for WPR activation because they
“reveal the constitutional demarcation line between responsive uses of military
force and proactive uses of such force—a line that has profound constitutional
significance. Authorizing employment of the armed forces under such
proactive use of force authority implicates the constitutional role of Congress
in war-making decisions.”282 According to Corn, Congress’s ambivalent
reactions to Presidential uses of force are the reason a more recognizable
trigger is necessary.
It is precisely because of [congressional ambivalence] that a
meaningful and operationally pragmatic notification trigger is so
important. Because any initiation of hostilities beyond the limited
scope of responsive/defensive actions will require authorization of
supplemental ROE measures, a coextensive congressional
notification requirement triggered by ROE approval will provide
Congress the opportunity to exercise its constitutional role.283

Under Corn’s proposal, anytime the President deployed military personnel
and gave them mission-specific ROE, the notification and consultation
provisions of the WPR would be triggered. It is unlikely that President’s would
avoid providing the military with the appropriate ROE simply to avoid the
WPR because the risks to military personnel would be too great.
As useful as Professor Corn’s suggestion might be if applied to today’s
WPR, it would not sufficiently resolve the problems of emerging technologies.
In many instances, those who use cyber tools will be governed by ROE;
however, there will certainly be times when they are not. A similar situation
likely exists for drones. Because of the special approval process used for armed
drone attacks, a formal mission-specific ROE may not be promulgated to
govern the use of force, particularly if it is an attempt at an individual target.
The use of nanotechnology and drones pose the same problems with respect to
ROE. Certainly offensive uses of these weapons will be so highly controlled, at
least initially, that reliance on a supplemental mission-specific ROE measure
will not be sufficient to accomplish the notification and consultation
requirements.

281
282
283

Corn, supra note 11, at 694.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 728.
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Perhaps most importantly, the pressure for the President to issue mission
accomplishment ROE in order to preserve the lives of military personnel will
not exist with non-human weapons such as drones, cyber tools, autonomous
weapons, etc. This will allow the President to manipulate the use of ROE in
order to prevent the requirement to go to Congress. In other words, in a
situation where the President would issue mission-specific ROE such as
sending a SEAL team into Pakistan to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, the
issuance of mission-specific ROE would be completely unnecessary if the
same mission were going to be accomplished by an armed unmanned drone or
by a lethal nanobot carrying a genomic identifier.
4. All Offensive Strikes
Along with Allison Arnold,284 Julia Chen is among the first to recognize
the inadequacies of the WPR in confronting modern technologies. Chen argues
that the WPR “can no longer accomplish its intended purpose and should be
replaced by new war powers framework legislation.”285 She proposes that the
WPR, or WPCA, be amended to cover “all offensive strikes.”286
Chen’s proposal is intended to include all personnel who might be engaged
in offensive military operations, not just military personnel,287 as originally
proposed by Senator Thomas Eagleton.288 She argues that the Constitution’s
grant of Congressional power over letters of marque and reprisal indicate that
Congress should use the War Powers framework to control civilian agencies,
such as the CIA, that might also involve themselves in armed conflict.289
However, as Chen rightly acknowledges, other statutory authorities
regulate the CIA and other intelligence activities conducted by U.S. citizens.290
Additionally, civilian agencies, and even civilians who accompany military
forces, have no authority to participate in offensive military actions under the
Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC).291 When they do so, they lose their

284

Arnold, supra note 191, at 176–77.
Chen, supra note 38, at 1795.
286 Id. at 1802.
287 Id. at 1785–88.
288 119 CONG. REC. 25,079 (1973) (statement of Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton).
289 Chen, supra note 38, at 1797.
290 Chen concedes that intelligence activities are currently governed by statutes such as the Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1991, 50 U.S.C. § 413 (as amended).
291 See generally CORN, ET AL., supra note 95, at 131–57 (explaining the status of civilians under the
LOAC).
285
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protections292 and may be prosecuted for their war-like acts.293 When Congress
authorizes the President to exercise the nation’s war powers, it is not intending
to authorize civilian participation in hostilities.294 This is amply illustrated by
the fact that in the current fight against terrorist organizations around the
world, the AUMF does not relieve the President of making Presidential
findings under 50 U.S.C. Sec. 413b(a).295
Additionally, using the term “offensive” would apply nicely to most
existing technologies but will not fit as well with future technologies. For
example, in the case of a latent attack discussed above,296 the triggering
mechanism may be the victim’s own actions, such as targeting a certain
weapon or platform. Further, many future cyber activities may be created and
used as defensive capabilities but have an autonomous strike-back capability
that would be defensive in nature but still have impacts against foreign
systems. Autonomous weapons systems would have the same characteristics.
Because of these issues, though Chen’s proposal would also accomplish the
much-needed extension of the WPR over some emerging technologies, it is
underinclusive of certain technologies and too expansive in creating a situation
where the President would be overregulated in his exercise of Executive
authority.
****
Despite the numerous attempts to modify the WPR, it does not appear that
any of the existing suggestions are sufficient to ensure the notification and
consultation that Congress is seeking from the President, particularly with
respect to emerging technologies. The next section will propose an amendment
to the WPR that will solve this problem.

292 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June
1977, 1125 UNTS 3; CORN, ET AL., supra note 95, at 168–70.
293 CORN, ET AL., supra note 95, at 468.
294 The drafters of the WPCA recognized this distinction and specifically excluded “covert actions” from
its coverage. BAKER, ET AL., supra note 8, at 36.
295 Bob Woodward, CIA Told To Do ‘Whatever Necessary’ to Kill Bin Laden, WASH. POST, Oct. 21,
2001, at A1.
296 See infra Part I.B.1.
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B. A Proposal for Future Armed Conflicts
As mentioned throughout this article, the primary weakness of the WPR
with respect to future armed conflicts is the inability of the triggering
mechanisms to adequately regulate emerging technologies. The limited
application to only “armed forces” and the current understanding of
“hostilities” is unable to capture the kinds of military actions the President will
likely take in the future, leaving Congress without a mechanism to force
notification and consultation. Each of these terms must be expanded to
accomplish the WPR’s297 stated goal of assisting Congress in playing its
constitutional role in war making.
1. Supplies or Capabilities
The inadequacy of the term “armed forces” has been discussed at length.298
It is clear that many of the emerging technologies will not involve “boots on
the ground” or even in the airspace.299 These technologies will be planned,
created, and initiated by humans, but humans will be distant in both time and
space from their lethal effects. In order to cover these types of future military
operations, the WPR needs to clarify its applicability to these “humanless”
means and methods of warfare.
The solution to this dilemma is to add language that includes “capabilities”
to the coverage of the WPR. In other words, the language from Section 4(a)300
would be amended from its current form of “In the absence of a declaration of
war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—”301 to
read “In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States
Armed Forces personnel, supplies or capabilities are introduced or
effectuated—.”
By adding the proposed language, the statute would be clear as to what
elements of the armed forces were governed by the statute. While the current
statute is only understood to govern personnel, adding “supplies” and
297 These suggestions apply equally to the WPCA if Congress decides to pass Senator McCain’s proposed
legislation. See generally Floor Remarks by Senator John McCain Introducing War Powers Consultation Act
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/1/floor-remarks-by-senator-johnmccain-introducing-war-powers-consultation-act (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
298 See generally infra Part III.A.
299 See generally infra Part I.A.
300 War Powers Resolution § 4(a), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973). The added language would also be
used in the other areas of the WPR where section 4(a)’s language is reproduced.
301 Id.
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“capabilities” would extend the statute to cover the emerging technologies
discussed in this paper.
The statute would also need to include the following definitions in order to
provide clarity:
Armed Forces Personnel - For purposes of this chapter, the term “Armed
Forces Personnel” means personnel who are members of or belong to the
armed forces as defined in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 101(a)(4).
Armed Forces Supplies - For purposes of this chapter, the term “Armed Forces
Supplies” has the same meaning as 10 U.S.C. Sec. 101(a)(14). It does not
include goods and services transferred under Title 22 of the United States
Code.
Armed Forces Capabilities - For purposes of this chapter, the term “Armed
Forces Capabilities” means any service, process, function, or action that is
used, directed, initiated, established, or created by the armed forces (as defined
in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 101(a)(4)) that produces or results in an effect or condition
designed to accomplish a military objective.
The definition of “Armed Forces Capabilities” is designed to be very
inclusive but limited to military capabilities. The President will have many
other capabilities that he can choose to use that will not be regulated by this
statute but will be regulated elsewhere. It is also specifically designed to
include future technologies like those discussed above, and others yet to be
developed.
Adding the word “effectuate” to the statute would cover some weapons
systems like cyber tools, that might be introduced at one point, but sit dormant
until needed in the future. At the future time, when the tool was effectuated
and its effects initiated, the President would need to notify Congress.
The amendment of this language triggering the application of the WPR will
vastly increase the coverage of the notification responsibility of the President,
particularly with respect to emerging technologies.
2. Violation of Sovereignty
The second trigger, that of “hostilities,” would also need to be adapted for
future technologies. The Executive Branch’s definition of hostilities has
become too narrow over time and the capabilities of emerging technologies
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will largely fall outside that definition. The scope of the second trigger needs
to have a geographic element as well as a descriptive element. Some actions
that will never be significant enough to reach the level of “hostilities,” may
still violently offend another nation and lead to armed conflict.
In order to minimize the problems from maximizing the coverage, the
current phrase in Section 4(a) of the WPR that states “into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances”302 should be amended to read “into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, or that violate the sovereignty of a foreign nation.”
The addition of the violation of sovereignty will increase the scope of the
WPR to include those areas not currently covered by hostilities. Using cyber
tools similar to STUXNET, which do not risk much escalation or present much
exposure to U.S. forces, will still be covered if they were used or designed to
have effects in the sovereign territory303 of another nation. A similar analysis
would apply to the use of nanotechnology or genomics, bringing these future
technologies under the coverage of the WPR.
Using the word “violate” removes consensual activities that do not equate
to hostilities. Tying the statute to a violation of sovereignty goes to the heart of
what the WPR was meant to accomplish by ensuring the President notifies and
consults with Congress before taking actions that might lead to war. In many
cases, violations of sovereignty can be considered a “use of force”304 or
escalate into a “use of force” under the United Nations Charter paradigm.305
This is particularly true of violations of sovereignty by the military.
302

War Powers Resolution § 4(a)(1).
There has been much discussion on the issue of applying the doctrine of sovereignty to cyber
operations. In the author’s opinion, the Tallinn Manual contains the best discussion of the issues. See generally
THE TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, at 42–53. See also Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Sovereignty: The Way
Ahead, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2466904.
304 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
305 The current regime for regulating force by states is found in the United Nations Charter. A complete
analysis of this regime is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it here to say that Article 2.4 of the Charter
states the basic obligation of states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Id. There is a vast array of literature on this subject. See
Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 114–36
(Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); Applicable to the topic of this article, several commentators have
written about the application of the “use of force” paradigm specifically to cyber operations. See generally THE
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 48, at 42–53; Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back
303
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The statute would not preclude all violations of a state’s sovereignty, and
the President would still have considerable room to effect foreign relations
with other Executive assets. But the use of the military to violate the
sovereignty of another state would trigger the WPR requirements.
CONCLUSION
Congress initially passed the WPR because it felt that it was unable, under
the practice at the time, to meaningfully engage with the Executive on warmaking issues. The recent events in Libya, Syria, and Iraq reinforce the fact
that the WPR has not solved this Constitutional issue. Reliance on the triggers
of “armed forces” and “hostilities” have not resulted in the notification and
consultation Congress was seeking with respect to war-making.
These WPR triggers will be even less effective as emerging technologies
develop and are used in future armed conflicts. Cyber tools, unmanned and
autonomous weapons and weapons systems, nanotechnology, genomics and a
host of other future developments provide effective tools for the President to
use as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and fall outside the current
WPR. The President will be able to utilize these and other future capabilities
without triggering the WPR requirements.
Amending the WPR to include supplies and capabilities and to cover
actions that violate the sovereignty of a foreign nation will increase the
coverage of the WPR and effectuate the intention of Congress to regain their
Constitutional role in war-making.

to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 427 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and
the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 587 (2011).

